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Administrative Alternative Dispute
Resolution: The Development of
Negotiated Rulemaking and
Other Processes
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative procedure was the original alternative dispute reso-
lution technique. However, the administrative procedures were in-
creasingly institutionalized and had become rigid and cumbersome by
the mid-1970's. In the last decade the search for a different approach
to formal administrative proceedings has produced promising alterna-
tives. In particular, negotiated rulemaking has gained respect as an
alternative to hybrid rulemaking, and many agencies are considering
arbitration, fact finding, and mediation rather than formal adjudica-
tory hearings to resolve certain cases.
Unfortunately, discussions about Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) in the legal community have failed to appreciate the enor-
mous flexibility that exists under present law to improve judicial and
administrative procedures in traditional forums. Negotiated
rulemaking has explored this flexibility, finding it preferable in
many ways to the erection of parallel channels for dispute resolution.
Negotiated rulemakingi is a process for resolving interest disputes
which is similar in many ways to the legislative process. It emerged
* Professor of Law, Villanova University Law School. S.B. Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology 1966; S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of
Management 1970; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center 1975; Member of the Bar,
Virginia, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, United States Supreme Court; Deputy
Under Secretary of Labor 1975-76; Co-Vice Chairman, Committee on Dispute Resolu-
tion, ABA Section on Administrative Law.
1. Negotiated rulemaking is a specific application of regulatory negotiation. It re-
fers to the use of negotiation in the decision-making process associated with rulemak-
ing. Regulatory negotiation refers to the use of negotiation in any decision-making
process by an administrative agency.
as a distinct administrative law concept in the late 1970's because no-
tice-and-comment and hybrid rulemaking 2 processes were inappro-
priate for making quasi-legislative, administrative agency decisions.
Sanctioned by the Administrative Conference of the United States3
(ACUS) as a worthy alternative to hybrid rulemaking, negotiated
rulemaking has been used successfully by four different agencies and
warrants even wider use.
In fact, negotiated rulemaking is the only one of several alternative
dispute resolution techniques that can be used by administrative
agencies. It is designed to facilitate resolution of "interest disputes"
whereas other techniques, such as arbitration, fact finding, and medi-
ation are more suited to "rights disputes." Each of these rights dis-
putes resolution techniques has been used or considered to some
degree.4
This article reviews the negotiated rulemaking concept in the con-
text of the ACUS recommendations and agency experience, and con-
siders recent efforts to simplify the handling of individual cases. It
also builds on the author's report to the ACUS on four completed
rule negotiations5 which led ACUS to adopt Recommendation 85-5 in
2. Terminology is a problem in comparing negotiated rulemaking to more tradi-
tional processes. This article uses the term adjudication to refer to an adversarial de-
cision-making process in which the parties present their cases to the agency by
examining witnesses and introducing qualifying documents somewhat in accordance
with formal rules of evidence. Hybrid rulemaking is a procedure imposed by statute
or the judiciary under the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA] in which
adjudicatory procedures are used to some degree in the rulemaking process, though
the type of decision-making involved would be termed "rulemaking" and not "adjudi-
cation" as those terms are defined by the APA. Hybrid rulemaking is discussed more
fully in Section VI of this article.
3. The Administrative Conference of the United States [hereinafter ACUS] was
established to improve administrative procedures within federal agencies. Administra-
tive Conference Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964). The President appoints a
full-time chairman to the ACUS for a five-year term and he is the only person entitled
to compensation for his services. The Council, which is the executive board, consists of
the chairman and 10 other members appointed by the President for three-year terms.
Only half of those 10 members may be drawn from federal agencies. The total mem-
bership of the ACUS may not exceed 91 members nor be fewer than 75 members. In
addition to the Council, the membership is comprised of 44 government members
(heads of agencies or their designees) from 36 agencies and approximately 36 nongov-
ernmental members appointed by the chairman, with Council's approval, for two-year
terms. The Council must call at least one plenary session during each year. The mem-
bership meeting in plenary session is known as the Assembly of the Administrative
Conference. Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-576 (1983).
4. Section VIII of this article explores recent ACUS recommendations covering
ADR techniques for rights disputes.
5. H. Perritt, Analysis of Four Negotiated Rulemaking Efforts (Nov. 15, 1985)
(available from the ACUS). An edited version of the report appears in Perritt, Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Ad-
ministrative Conkference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986) [hereinafter
Evaluation of Recommendations]. Abbreviated summaries of the report appeared in
Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 482 (1986),
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late 1985.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Emergence of APA From ADR
The Administrative Procedure Act6 (APA) emerged from a debate
over whether administrative procedure should be institutionalized ac-
cording to a judicial model. 7 President Roosevelt vetoed an initial
version of the APA in 1939 because it sought to force administrative
procedures into an adversarial decision-making mode.8 The Act, as
finally passed, recognized a considerable variety of procedures em-
ployed by different agencies. 9 The modern search for ADR tech-
niques is largely consistent with the earlier recognition that diversity
among procedural techniques is as appropriate in administrative pro-
cedure as it is in judicial procedure, depending on the nature of the
dispute to be resolved.
B. Search For Alternatives
New administrative processes originated from the increased use of
administrative litigation to address problems previously dealt with in
markets, through private contractual negotiation,lO or by elected rep-
resentatives in legislative assemblies. The use of administrative regu-
lations to deal with these problems stemmed from a combination of
increased government intervention to deal with market imperfec-
tions'1 and the impracticability of legislative assemblies taking on the
resultant burden of decision-making themselves.
While administrative processes evolved toward more adversarial ju-
dicially based models, negotiation was already deeply rooted as a
means of setting policy. When rules for societal conduct are made in
private markets or in representative assemblies, the process of nego-
tiation is relied upon.12 Negotiation occurs as part of the legislative
and Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 471
(1986).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).
7. See generally Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 511 (1986).
8. Id. at 512.
9. Id. at 515.
10. See L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 172-187 (1981) (contrasting
private negotiation with governmental decision-making).
11. See S. BREYER, REGULATIONS AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982); J. DUNLOP, DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING 4 (1984).
12. See J. DUNLOP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING
procedure in a representative assembly at two levels: first, as a part
of the process through which representatives are elected; and second,
as part of the interaction among the representatives making the com-
promises necessary to pass a statute. At both levels, no single inter-
est or constituency can get everything it wants; each must set
priorities for its demands, and trade off one against the other.1S
There is an incentive to find common ground, either to form a major-
ity to elect a favored candidate or to form a majority to pass desired
legislation.
The shift in rulemaking responsibility from markets and legisla-
tures to administrative agencies made negotiation more difficult. Es-
sentially, agencies make rules because the legislature has left certain
issues among conflicting interests unresolved. In exercising the
rulemaking responsibility delegated by the legislature, however,
agencies lack many of the institutional attributes that facilitate ac-
commodation among conflicting interests. In particular, accommoda-
tion and compromise, which result from the election of
representatives are absent 14 and thus agencies must deal with a broad
range of atomistic interests' 5 rather than benefiting from the aggre-
gation of interests that occurs in election politics. Additionally, there
is no assurance that even a multi-member agency represents the ma-
jor conflicting interests on any issue before it. Thus, the framework
for the second stage of accommodation, which is typical of a legisla-
tive institution, may also be lacking.
Since an administrative agency lacks the institutional attributes
which make private accommodation an integral part of the legislative
process, it must find other ways to strike a balance between compet-
ing views in developing a rule which will be acceptable to those af-
fected by it.16
1-22 (1984) (describing and comparing private and political negotiation); J. HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 19 (1982) (stating that legislature is basically an arena for
bargaining); V.O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 7 (1942) (politics is a
struggle among groups or interests); Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternative in Dispute
Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1421 (1984) (describing negotiations process).
13. See generally Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1183, 1188 (1973) (describing the pervasiveness of political compromise in the context
of administrative regulation).
14. Of course, some degree of accommodation occurs in connection with the ap-
pointment of administrative agency policy personnel and in legislative oversight of
agency functioning. Nevertheless, agencies are only indirectly accountable to the pub-
lic and are subject to political forces only when the press or the public takes an inter-
est in an issue before an agency, or through occasional intervention by the legislature
or the executive.
15. The breadth of the interests with which an agency must deal is a function of
the type of program for which an agency is responsible.
16. In addition, the agency is obligated by law to pursue statutory objectives re-
gardless of what affected interests think. Agencies can only search for accommodation
consistent with their statutory mandates.
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Administrative law has searched in recent years for ways to recon-
cile conflicting interests.17 The original administrative law models
emphasized judicial review to keep agencies within statutory bounds,
and decisional procedures were designed to promote the accuracy, ra-
tionality, and reviewability of agency decisions.' 8 Yet administrative
procedures modeled on judicial processes do not fit the needs of ad-
ministrative rulemaking. Administrative law has struggled to pro-
vide a surrogate political process to ensure the fair representation of
a wide range of affected interests in the administrative decision-mak-
ing process.19 Until the mid-1970's, however, procedures continued to
be modeled on judicial trials despite the fact that they were ill suited
for a "surrogate political process. '20
A major cause of the discrepancy between administrative proce-
dure and the decision-making requirements of delegated legislative
power was the failure to distinguish "rights disputes" from "interest
disputes."21 Adjudication is designed to deal exclusively with rights
disputes,22 which are concerned with the application of pre-existing
legal standards or "rules of decision" to facts determined by the adju-
dicator. Interest disputes, on the other hand, are characterized by
the absence of pre-existing rules of decision. The resolution of inter-
est disputes requires the conflicting parties to work out the rules in a
way that accommodates their interests. Although the political pro-
cess and private contractual negotiation are well suited to resolving
interest disputes, the adjudicatory process is not.23 Nevertheless, ad-
judicatory procedures were superimposed on the rulemaking pro-
cess. 24 As agencies were delegated more responsibility for legislating,
the need for a process equipped to deal with interest disputes became
17. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
18. Id. at 1670.
19. Id. at 1670. See also Jaffe, supra note 13, at 1184, 1188 (criticizing model based
on the assumption that Congress establishes an objective that "is capable of disinter-
ested and nonpolitical administration," and suggesting instead a political model).
20. Stewart, supra note 17, at 1670.
21. See Perritt, And the Whole Earth Was of One Language: A Broad View of Dis-
pute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1221-29 (1984).
22. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369
(1979).
23. See id. at 368.
24. See infra section VI, subsection E of this article regarding hybrid rulemaking.
The point is not that APA "adjudication," under sections 556 and 557 is used in
rulemaking, but rather that certain trial type procedures associated with adjudication
have been superimposed on information rulemaking conducted under APA section
553.
more apparent.25
The development of new administrative processes accelerated in
the 1970's. Harvard law professor Richard B. Stewart, writing in
1975, considered some of the alternative procedures available to agen-
cies given responsibility for a surrogate political process.26 He con-
cluded that all of the obvious possibilities for application within
traditional procedural frameworks were seriously flawed.27 This
prompted Stewart to explore more "explicitly political" mechanisms
for interest representation.28
At the time Stewart was writing, some forms of administrative ne-
gotiations were well established, though not very visible.29 It was a
relatively common practice for parties who challenged a regulation to
negotiate an acceptable agreement. 30 Rather than litigate a rule's va-
lidity in the courts, a complainant would withdraw the complaint
challenging the rule in return for the promulgating agency's agree-
ment to modify the existing rule. This is exemplified in Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle.31 In this case, several environmental
groups32 brought four separate lawsuits against the Environmental
25. See Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs,
and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1393 (1984).
26. Stewart, supra note 17, at 1760-89.
27. Id. Stewart observed that agencies themselves are likely to afford certain in-
terests disproportionate influence, and that the courts are ill suited to force an alter-
ation in the balance of interests. Id. at 1789-90.
28. Id. at 1790.
29. Harter found examples of such alternatives in the Consumer Product Safety
Commission "offeror process," the National Institute of Building Sciences, innovations
by Secretary Dunlop, ad hoc efforts involving dam building and uranium mine siting
controversies, sequential negotiations frequently involved in formulating Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking, occupational safety and health consensus standards developed
by private groups, the National Coal Policy Project, site-specific environmental negoti-
ation, and negotiated settlements of lawsuits challenging Environmental Protection
Agency [hereinafter EPA] regulatory decisions. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 25-42 (1982). He might also have noted negotiations
within "rate bureaus" under the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Federal Railroad
Administration's experience with air brake regulations. In 1982, the Federal Railroad
Administration amended rules pertaining to railroad air brakes. The resulting changes
stemmed from a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [hereinafter NPRM] adopted at the
joint request of the Association of American Railroads, the main industry trade associ-
ation, and the Railway Labor Executives Association, a confederation of labor organi-
zations representing rail employees. 49 C.F.R. § 232 (1986). Comments submitted in
response to the NPRM were generally supportive, and resulted in a final rule reflect-
ing the labor-industry agreement. Id.
30. Harter, supra note 29, at 36. Harter further points out that the settlement of
agency disputes is specifically provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at
36 n.195 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1976)). Moreover, in approving agency negotiations,
the legislative history of the APA pointed to the courts' use of pre-trial proceedings to
dispose of much of their business. Id.
31. 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
32. These groups collectively form the Natural Resources Defense Council [here-
inafter NRDC]. The groups are the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc., National Audubon Society, Inc., Citizens for a Better
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Protection Agency (EPA), challenging its alleged failure to imple-
ment provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act relating
to toxic pollutants.33 While these suits were pending, the EPA and
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) began settlement nego-
tiations and later submitted a proposed settlement agreement to the
district court. Four industrial companies intervened in the proceed-
ing and vigorously opposed the proposed agreement; nonetheless, the
district court approved the settlement agreement. 34 Subsequently,
these same companies filed a motion to vacate the agreement and a
proposed modification 35 to that agreement. Both the district court 36
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied
the companies' motions.37 The Costle district court could have given
the companies greater opportunity to negotiate with the EPA and
NRDC about the strategy to be used in regulating toxic pollutants.
However, instead of involving the companies in the initial settlement
negotiations, the court simply heard opposing arguments to the
agreement which had been worked out between the EPA and
NRDC.38
At about the time that Stewart's article appeared, the policy cur-
rents were primarily influenced by John T. Dunlop,39 who regarded
Environment, Inc., and Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, Inc.
Id. at 1233 n.4, 1234.
33. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter FWPCA]. The first suit challenged the criterion that the EPA was using to deter-
mine which pollutants were toxic. The second and third suits were to compel the EPA
to promulgate effluent standards for substances presently on the Agency's list of toxic
pollutants. The fourth suit sought to compel the EPA to promulgate pretreatment
standards for various pollutants. Costle, 636 F.2d at 1234.
34. Costle, 636 F.2d at 1235 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8
Env't Rep. Cos. (BNA) 2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976)). The agreement was signed by the
EPA, the five environmental groups and the National Coal Association and was incor-
porated in a consent decree signed by the district court. The settlement agreement
outlined a strategy for regulating toxic pollutant discharges under the FWPCA. The
agreement included details about timing, scope, and nature of the regulatory programs
that the EPA agreed to initiate. Id.
35. Id. at 1237. This modification agreement was made after the NRDC com-
plained that the EPA was not observing the initial settlement agreement. While the
NRDC later withdrew its order to show cause against the EPA, the companies still
sought to challenge both settlement agreements. The district court denied both of the
companies' motions. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1259. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether it
was appropriate for the EPA to enter into an agreement that might infringe upon the
discretion that Congress had committed to the administrator. Id.
38. Id. at 1235.
39. Mr. Dunlop was Secretary of Labor from 1974-75, and before that, head of the
Nixon wage-and-price-controls program. Mr. Dunlop had a distinguished background
negotiation as an alternative to adjudicatory litigation in making ad-
ministrative rules. While Dunlop was Secretary of Labor he au-
thored a paper, "The Limits of Legal Compulsion," which he
distributed to the President, White House staff personnel concerned
with developing regulatory reform ideas, and Labor Department pol-
icy officials. The paper was ultimately published in several
journals.40
The paper began with an invitation to compare "essentially private
methods for rule-making within a broad and general governmental
context-exemplified by collective bargaining-and the more inten-
sive approach of governmental promulgation of mandatory regula-
tions."41  After identifying eleven problems with the existing
approach to regulation, the study went on to suggest that "the parties
who will be affected by a set of regulations should be involved to a
greater extent in developing those regulations."42
During his tenure as Secretary, Dunlop also sought to promote
greater consideration of the negotiation alternative in the academic
community. He directed the author of this article43 to establish liai-
son with professors of law and political science and with former gov-
ernment policy makers who might have an interest in the concept.
At one point, Dunlop invited Professor Stewart, Professor James Q.
Wilson, William Ruckelshaus, past and future Administrator of EPA,
and a number of others to discuss alternatives to traditional rulemak-
ing in an informal seminar. During this period, Philip J. Harter was
detailed from the staff of the ACUS to the Council of Economic Ad-
visers to work with Joseph L. Kirk, Director of Policy Analysis for
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), to ex-
amine alternatives to traditional administrative processes.44
After Dunlop resigned as Secretary of Labor in February, 1976, his
successor, W.J. Usery, Jr., encouraged the author and Under Secre-
as a professor of economics and dean of the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard,
labor mediator, and advisor of presidents on national labor-management policy. As
much as anyone in the United States at the time, he was the expert on the process of
negotiation as a means of resolving workplace disputes.
40. See Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67 (1976).
41. Id. The paper offered, by way of example, the method used by Dunlop to im-
plement section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which precluded distribu-
tion of certain mass transit subsidy funds until the Secretary of Labor certified that
employees would not be adversely affected by the federally funded activities. Mr.
Dunlop also sought to mediate an agreement between the United Steelworkers and
the Steel Industry on a health standard for coke oven emissions. This effort to negoti-
ate a rule is discussed more fully in Section V of this article.
42. Id.
43. During the period of time discussed in the text, the author of this article was
Deputy Under Secretary of Labor, responsible for assisting Dunlop with regulatory re-
form matters.
44. Memorandum from Paul W. MacAvoy to Executive Committee, Economic Pol-
icy Board (May 18, 1976).
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tary Michael Moskow to continue the regulatory reform effort. With
Usery's support, the Department sponsored doctoral research by
Lawrence Bacow, which resulted in the publication of a study of how
safety and health standards had been addressed through collective
bargaining in the automobile and other industries.45 Bacow went on
to play a central role in the drafting and implementation of the Mas-
sachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act,46 which provides a
statutory framework for negotiations between local communities and
developers of waste disposal sites in that state.
The Department of Labor also provided seed money for an inter-
disciplinary effort at Harvard University, which ultimately developed
into the Harvard Negotiation Project. The first executive director of
the Harvard effort was William Drayton, who was Associate Admin-
istrator of EPA during the Carter Administration. Minow, an EPA
attorney who worked with Drayton, subsequently helped Harter for-
mulate the ACUS negotiated rulemaking recommendations.
Thus, the seeds were planted at the ACUS, Department of Labor,
and EPA for the negotiated rulemaking idea. Bacow, Drayton, Har-
ter, Ruckelshaus, and Stewart all played major roles in refining the
negotiation concept.
Dunlop's idea of using negotiation as a regulatory procedure re-
sponded to Stewart's exploration of explicitly political processes. It
was another means of permitting political bargaining that was not
openly considered in Stewart's article. Yet, the negotiation idea
presented difficulties, especially with respect to the representation
process.
These difficulties were addressed by Harter, under ACUS sponsor-
ship, after his experience in examining OSHA as part of the Eco-
nomic Policy Board task force. Harter wrote a law review article47 in
which he carried the Dunlop concept further. He sought to develop
criteria for generalizing the use of "explicitly political" processes 48 to
improve administrative agency decision-making.
Harter, contemporaneously with writing his article, also drafted
what became ACUS Recommendation 82-4, which concluded:
45. L. BACOW, NEGOTIATING HEALTH AND SAFETY (1976). Mr. Bacow is now on the
faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 12-15 (West 1981). See Bacow & Milkey,
Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Ap-
proach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265 (1982).
47. Harter, supra note 29, at 1. See also S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 592-607 (2d ed. 1985).
48. Harter, supra note 29, at 42-61.
Agencies should consider using regulatory negotiation, as described in this
recommendation, as a means of drafting for agency consideration the text of a
proposed regulation. A proposal to establish a regulatory negotiating group
could be made either by the agency (for example, in an advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking) or by the suggestion of any interested person. 4 9
C. The Benzene, FAA, and EPA Experiences With Negotiated
Rulemaking
In the three years following adoption of ACUS Recommendation
82-4, negotiated rulemaking was utilized four times by federal agen-
cies. The following table summarizes the four negotiations.
TABLE 1 - FOUR RULEMAKING NEGOTIATIONS
Agency Subject Dates Outcome Status
OSHA Benzene 1983- Adjourned Final
Health Std. 1984 Rule Out 5 o
FAA Flight & 1983- Consensus Final
Duty Time 1985 Rule Out 51
EPA Non-Confor. 1984- Consensus Final
Penalties 1985 Rule Out 52
EPA Pesticide 1984- Consensus Final
Exemptions 1985 Rule Out 5 3
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) used negotiated
rulemaking to develop a new flight-and-duty-time regulation for air-
line flight crews.54 The EPA used negotiated rulemaking to develop
proposed rules on nonconformance penalties for vehicle emissions,
49. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 4(g), 8 (1986).
50. On December 10, 1984, the steelworkers filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
seeking to require the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter
OSHA] to issue an NPRM for a benzene standard within 30 days of the court's
decision, and to issue a permanent standard within seven months of the NPRM.
OSHA issued its NPRM just before oral argument. United Steelworkers of America v.
Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1117, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1986). After oral argument, the
court ordered OSHA to submit a timetable for post-NPRM activities. The timetable
submitted required OSHA to complete its staff analysis by November 10, 1986, and to
issue a final standard by February 10, 1986. The court denied the petition for faster
action on the proposed rule and declined to retain jurisdiction on February 25, 1986.
Id. at 1120. A final rule was issued on September 11, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 (1987)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910).
51. 50 Fed. Reg. 29,306 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 121, 135).
52. 50 Fed. Reg. 36,732 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 66).
53. The final rule was published on January 15, 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 1896 (1986).
Comments on the proposed rule were received from 19 sources. In its preamble to the
final rule, the EPA discussed these comments, referring to the negotiations with
respect to two of the comments, but otherwise offering its own rationale in support of
the rule.
54. For details of the Federal Aviation Administration [hereinafter FAA] negotia-
tion, see Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1667-74.
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and on emergency exemptions from pesticide regulations.55 OSHA
encouraged labor, public interest, and industry representatives to ne-
gotiate a standard for occupational exposure to benzene. 56 Unfortu-
nately, the benzene negotiations did not produce a consensus among
the parties on a proposed rule, but the other three negotiations did
result in at least partial agreement, and in proposed rules based on
the negotiations. Three of the rules have been promulgated in final
form, and none has been challenged.
Other agencies have shown an interest in the negotiated rulemak-
ing process, and other major efforts are underway.57 In order to pro-
vide guidelines for use of the new process, the ACUS published an
additional set of recommendations in December, 1985,58 as proposed
by the author of this article.
The 1982 ACUS recommendations address the role of negotiated
rulemaking within the legal framework of the APA and judicially de-
veloped administrative law concepts. In contrast, the 1985 recom-
mendations address the dynamics of the negotiation process in the
rulemaking setting. Together, the two ACUS recommendations pres-
ent a framework for planning a rule negotiation.
D. Recommendation 85-5
The report accompanying ACUS Recommendation 85-5 concluded
that negotiated rulemaking is a practical alternative to notice-and-
comment or hybrid rulemaking, and that Recommendation 82-4 was
basically sound. Assuming negotiations are permitted by the APA,59
Recommendation 85-5 offers guidance on how agencies and private
participants can increase their chances of reaching a consensus.
III. THE DYNAMICS OF RULE NEGOTIATION
As Recommendation 85-5 recognized, the utility of negotiated
rulemaking should be evaluated by reference to the dynamics of the
negotiating process in the administrative regulatory setting. This sec-
tion considers those dynamics, explaining how they justify particular
ACUS recommendations.
55. For details of the EPA negotiations, see id. at 1674-82.
56. For details on the benzene negotiation, see id. at 1647-67.
57. See in;fra Section V of this article.
58. ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1986).
59. See infra Section VI of this article.
A. BATNA Concept
Notwithstanding efforts to impose adjudicatory procedures for the
formulation of regulatory policy, regulatory program decisions are
made in a political environment.6 0 They provide a mechanism within
which political accommodation can occur, but it can work only if peo-
ple who are able to use other processes have an incentive to partici-
pate in negotiations and to reach an agreement. The best way to
understand incentives to negotiate is to consider negotiations be-
tween two hypothetical, monolithic parties.61 Having identified the
incentives for these hypothetical parties, one can then overlay com-
plications resulting from intra-constituency disagreements.
A useful conceptual structure for understanding incentives to ne-
gotiate was suggested by Professors Fisher and Ury in their popular
book on the negotiation process.62 They explain that the participa-
tion of any party to a negotiation will be guided by that party's "Best
Alternative to Negotiated Agreement" (BATNA). A participant in
negotiations will not concede to an outcome worse than its BATNA.
If a party thinks that its BATNA is superior to anything that can be
obtained in negotiation, the party will simply not negotiate.
The following examples may be helpful. If I am considering buy-
ing a car from you, and know that I can get the identical car from
your competitor across the street for $10,000, I will negotiate with
you only if I think our negotiations may result in an agreement for
less than $10,000. The $10,000 is my BATNA. Or, if I am a plaintiff
in a personal injury lawsuit, and the expected net value6 3 of a jury
verdict to me is $25,000, I will negotiate a settlement with you, the
defendant, only if the settlement is worth more to me than $25,000.
My BATNA in these negotiations is $25,000.64
For potential participants in a regulatory negotiation, BATNA's
are determined by perceptions of what the agency will do in the ab-
sence of a negotiation. 65 A rational, monolithic party will participate
in regulatory negotiation only if it anticipates that the negotiated out-
come will be superior to its BATNA, as determined by its estimate of
60. See generally Jaffe, supra note 13, at 1188 (describing the pervasiveness of
political compromise in the context of administrative regulation).
61. Negotiation between monolithic parties is addressed in this section. Complica-
tions introduced by intra-constituency disagreements are addressed in Section III, sub-
section C of this article.
62. R. FISHER & W. URY, GErING TO YES (1981).
63. Litigation expenses, including the cost of possible appeals, must be subtracted
from the gross amount of the expected verdict, and the time-value of money must be
taken into account through an appropriate "discount rate."
64. See Perritt, supra note 21, at 1247-51.
65. What the agency will do is affected by what courts and the legislature will do,
so perceptions of these influences are important also.
[Vol. 14: 863, 1987] Administrative ADR
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
probable unilateral agency action.66 Since each party is likely to eval-
uate the unilateral agency outcome differently, or to measure the im-
pact of agency action against different cost or utility functions,
BATNA's will tend to vary appreciably.
The BATNA-determined participation incentive is also dynamic: it
will change over time for each party as it gets additional information
about the agency's intentions. More importantly, other negotiators,
neutral mediators or conveners, and the agency itself, can influence
party BATNA's, and hence party incentives to negotiate.
The most appropriate analogy to a regulatory negotiation is not a
traditional labor-management negotiation where BATNA's are deter-
mined by each party's assessment of the opponent's ability to inflict
injury or to offer rewards. Rather, the best analogy is to settlement
negotiations in civil litigation where party predictions of the probable
behavior of a nonparty, the judge or jury, determine BATNA's. In
regulatory negotiations, as in settlement negotiations, the third party
decision-maker can influence party perception of the likely outcome
in the absence of a negotiated settlement. In other words, the agency
or judge changes BATNA's by what it says about its intentions.
This model suggests that regulatory negotiations are most likely to
be successful when the agency (or some other credible source) per-
suades each potential participant that unilateral agency action has
undesirable consequences for the potential participant. Less attrac-
tive BATNA's result in greater incentives to negotiate a solution.
This part of the analysis suggests the first hypothesis for effective
regulatory negotiation: parties will negotiate only if they perceive the
outcome of unilateral agency action to be worse than what is attaina-
ble in the negotiation.67 The hypothesis has two corollaries: (1) regu-
latory negotiations are more likely to be successful if the parties
agree on what the outcome will be in the absence of negotiations, or,
if they disagree, if they are all pessimistic rather than optimistic;
(2) regulatory negotiations are more likely to be successful if the
agency actively influences party perceptions of BATNA's, emphasiz-
ing the undesirable consequences of unilateral agency action in terms
relevant to each party.
The first four agency experiences with negotiated rulemaking illus-
66. The process was explored by my former student, Robert L. Sachs, Jr. See
Comment, An Alternative to the Traditional Rulemaking Process: A Case Study of Ne-
gotiation in the Development of Regulations, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1505 (1984).
67. This is the thrust of Recommendation Number 2 from ACUS Recommenda-
tion 85-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 2 (1986).
trated the validity of these hypotheses. BATNA's in the OSHA ben-
zene negotiations were relatively attractive, reducing incentives to
negotiate.68 The OSHA litigation had exaggerated points of disagree-
ment, and led to divergent perceptions of what OSHA was expected
to do in response to the Supreme Court's decision. Labor expected
OSHA action similar to the rule invalidated by the Supreme Court;
Industry expected such a standard could be blocked in litigation or in
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) clearance process.
Thus, each side perceived a relatively favorable BATNA, reducing
the incentives to negotiate.
Compared to BATNA's in the OSHA negotiation, BATNA's in the
FAA negotiation were relatively unattractive.69 The FAA's unsuc-
cessful attempts at flight-and-duty-time rulemaking had convinced
the participants that unilateral FAA action, within a fairly wide am-
bit of legal permissibility, could be harmful to their interests.
The need for favorable BATNA's was the motivation behind
paragraphs one and two of ACUS Recommendation 85-5.
1. An agency sponsoring a negotiated rulemaking proceeding should take
part in the negotiations ....
2. Negotiations are unlikely to succeed unless all participants (including the
agency) are motivated throughout the process by the view that a negotiated
agreement will provide a better alternative than a rule developed under tradi-
tional processes. The agency, accordingly, should be sensitive to each partici-
pant's need to have a reasonably clear expectation of the consequences of not
reaching a consensus. Agencies must be mindful, from the beginning to the
end of negotiations, of the impact that agency conduct and statements have on
party expectations. The agency, and others involved in the negotiations, may
need to communicate with other participants-perhaps with the assistance of
a mediator or facilitator-to ensure that each one has realistic expectations
about the outcome of agency action in the absence of a negotiated agreement.
Communications of this character always should consist of an honest expres-
sion of agency actions that are realistically possible. 7 0
Paragraph one derives from the principle articulated in paragraph
two. Paragraph two stresses that agencies should understand the ma-
jor influence they exert on party expectations and, therefore, on
party BATNA's.71 This is the major lesson learned from the unsuc-
cessful benzene negotiations. The utility of participation for a party
is measured in terms of the likelihood of a negotiated settlement that
is equal to or better than each party's BATNA. Hence, in the same
way as a judge seeks to induce private litigants to settle a lawsuit, the
agency, as decision-maker, must point out the flaws in each party's
argument and position, and ensure that each party understands why
68. For details on the benzene negotiation, see Evaluation of Recommendations,
supra note 5, at 1647-67.
69. For details on the FAA negotiation, see id., supra note 5, at 1667-74.
70. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 91 1, 2 (1986).
71. The Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement [hereinafter BATNA] concept
is explained supra, at text accompanying note 62.
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the outcome of agency action, in the absence of negotiated agree-
ment, may not be as favorable as the party anticipates.
Agency participation in negotiations, addressed in Recommenda-
tion Number one, promotes realistic party expectations. The agencies
should also be willing to prepare and distribute draft rules or out-
lines, and instead of fearing premature disclosure of tentative staff
views, they should actually welcome such disclosure because it
portends what an agency might do in the absence of a negotiated
rule. These drafts could even serve as a useful framework or agenda
for negotiations.7 2
Of course, much of this conditioning of party expectation can be
done by the facilitators, but the facilitators' representations will not
be credible for long unless the agency acts to reinforce the represen-
tations. Agency participation occurs in various ways, ranging from
full participation as a negotiator to acting as an observer and com-
menting on possible agency reactions and concerns. Agency repre-
sentatives participating in negotiations should be sufficiently senior
in rank to be able to express agency views with credibility.
This recommendation states that agencies should use negotiations
as the primary channel for communicating with the parties. This is
another major lesson learned from the unsuccessful effort to negoti-
ate a benzene health standard. The utility of negotiating is an in-
verse function of group influence outside the negotiations, by direct
dealings with the agency, by contact with OMB, by litigating in the
courts, and by lobbying with the Congress.
The willingness of a group to participate meaningfully in negoti-
ated rulemaking is affected by how it perceives its ability to influence
the content of the rule through other channels. A group that has a
low estimate of its leverage with the agency may embrace negotia-
tions as a way of participating equally with other interests and as an
improvement over what it believes its influence would be in more
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking. Conversely, a group
that believes it can effectively influence the agency may fear negotia-
tion will reduce its impact and thus may be more reluctant to partici-
pate meaningfully. Similarly, a group that has been successful in
judicial challenges to agency decisions is more likely to prefer the lit-
igation alternative to negotiations. A group perceiving itself with
72. Such conditioning of party expectations by the agency is delicate; it can rein-
force party fears that the agency will not participate in the negotiations in good faith,
or it can chill meaningful party contributions by signaling that the agency has already
reached a decision.
substantial influence at OMB or in Congress is less likely to be en-
thusiastic about negotiating. Of course, the willingness to negotiate is
not dichotomous: the factors that make a group less willing to partici-
pate may permit it to participate, but not to be willing to make many
changes in its position.
Participation by the agency-and by OMB-reduces the real or
perceived potential for parties to undermine the negotiating process
by making "end runs" to the agency or to OMB.73 Agency participa-
tion also affords an opportunity for greater access to the agency than
some parties might expect in hybrid rulemaking. Participation also
increases the likelihood that the agency and OMB will support, and
understand the basis of, negotiated recommendations. Furthermore,
an agency's involvement broadens the range of options available re-
garding consensus.74 The same logic might militate in favor of con-
gressional staff participation in some negotiations. If, for some
reason, agency or OMB participation is not acceptable, the facilitator/
mediator should serve as a channel between the negotiations and
OMB and congressional staff.
The most striking difference between the benzene negotiations and
the other negotiations is that OSHA did not participate in the ben-
zene negotiations, whereas agencies did participate in the others.75
Agency participation prevented harmful divergences in expectations
about what the agency would do unilaterally, and therefore condi-
tioned BATNA's so as to maintain incentives for negotiated agree-
ment. In the benzene negotiation, the participants came to believe
they would do better outside the negotiations, working directly with
OSHA or with OMB, and their BATNA's shifted accordingly, render-
ing negotiated agreement unattractive.
The FAA and EPA were committed to the negotiating process as
the primary means of developing a regulation; OSHA was not. At
73. Some agencies and commentators question the appropriateness of the Office of
Management and Budget [hereinafter OMB] participation, arguing that it is the
agency's responsibility to obtain OMB concurrence in any proposed regulation. The
whole point of negotiations, however, is to get all interests likely to influence the sub-
stance of a regulation to communicate directly with each other. Under Exec. Order
No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1985 & Supp.
1986), OMB has a major role to play. The cotton dust experience, described in Section
V of this article, demonstrates the risk of negotiating a consensus without taking
OMB's views into account. Evidence from the benzene negotiations suggests that In-
dustry's position was significantly determined by what it thought OMB would do with
a unilateral OSHA proposal. Such perceptions should be tested and taken into account
in the negotiations themselves. At a minimum, agencies considering negotiated
rulemaking in a particular proceeding should have a clear strategy for obtaining OMB
support and for involving OMB as negotiations proceed. This may be accomplished us-
ing facilitator/mediators as intermediaries.
74. Consensus is discussed in Section III, subsection B of this article.
75. Paragraphs 4(g) and 8 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, C.F.R. § 305.82-4
4(g), 8 (1986), recommends agency participation.
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least some of the difference in agency commitment can be attributed
to the lower level of participation by OSHA. The FAA, its parent
agency, the Department of Transport (DOT), and the EPA had key
personnel who were enthusiastic about regulatory negotiation and
who had the skills to mediate effectively, supplementing the media-
tion efforts of the facilitator/mediator; OSHA and the Department of
Labor (DOL) did not. In particular, both DOT and EPA had policy
level officials responsible for promoting regulatory negotiation; DOL
did not.
There are, of course, various forms of agency participation. Harter
recognized implicitly two forms of negotiated rulemaking, one in
which the agency participates in the negotiations ("Agency Participa-
tion Model") and another in which it does not ("Agency Oversight
Model").76 The same two variants had been addressed more explic-
itly in a Harvard Law Review note published around the same
time.77 Recommendation 85-5 does not contemplate that the "agency
oversight" model would never be useful. The parties might be moti-
vated so strongly to negotiate a resolution of their disagreements that
agency participation would actually be unnecessary.78
In most cases, the agency should be represented on the committee
and should ask questions and try to gain information from partici-
pants in order to gain substantive knowledge and to probe the weak-
nesses in a party's position. Experience suggests, however, that the
agency should avoid directing the participants toward one result or
another since that kind of participation can stifle debate. There is a
fine line between an agency's showing its hand too early and offering
a proposal to stimulate movement in the negotiations and remind
participants what the prospects of deadlock may be.
B. Consensus and Mediation
The objective of negotiated rulemaking is to reach "consensus"
among the participants as to the content of the proposed rule. Harter
characterized the definition of consensus as "one of the most difficult
76. Harter, supra note 29, at 57-58.
77. See Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1875-76 (1981) (distinguishing between "Agency
Oversight Model," in which agency does not participate, and "Agency Participation
Model," in which it does).
78. The cotton dust negotiation is a clear example. See infra Section V of this
article.
and complex questions in regulatory negotiation." 79 He concluded
that experience was necessary before anyone could develop more
concrete ideas on what consensus should entail, pointing out, how-
ever, that the existence of a consensus is more a matter of feel, than
of mathematical calculation.80 The Harter formulation necessarily
omitted detailed formulation of the conditions conducive to closure
on an agreement.8 1
Harter and Recommendation 82-4 also recognized that the consen-
sus idea implies some kind of effective implementation process.8 2
Lack of an implementation process would destroy the core prerequi-
site of negotiation-namely, the parties' belief that their own inter-
ests will be furthered by negotiating.
In three of the four experiments (benzene, flight-and-duty-time,
and nonconference penalties (NCPs)) the participants fell short of
formal agreement on some of the major issues.8 3 Indeed, one could
argue that fewer fundamental matters separated the benzene negoti-
ators when negotiations were adjourned than separated the flight-
and-duty-time negotiators. Even so, the benzene negotiations are
widely perceived as having failed, while the flight-and-duty-time ne-
gotiations are perceived as having succeeded. The explanation for
different perceptions despite the similarity of results is attributable
to the difference in how the agency reacted when the negotiations
were adjourned. The FAA, having participated in the negotiating
sessions, had an understanding of what the parties could accept.
OSHA, on the other hand, who had not participated, had no such un-
derstanding. In order for the points of agreement on benzene to be
communicated to OSHA, a document had to be transmitted. How-
ever, the benzene negotiators had stipulated as a ground rule that no
document would be transmitted in the absence of a formal agreement
on a total package. No such ground rule bound the flight-and-duty-
time or the NCP participants or agency.8 4
79. Harter, supra note 29, at 92.
80. Id. at 93.
81. Paragraph 11 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 11 (1986),
addressed consensus in very general terms: "Consensus ... means that each interest
represented in the negotiating groups concurs in the result, unless all members of the
group agree at the outset on another definition." Id. That paragraph contemplated,
however, that the negotiators might issue a report indicating agreement on some issues
and disagreement on other issues.
82. Harter, supra note 29, at 51. This criterion is addressed in part by paragraphs
13 and 14 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 13, 14 (1986), propos-
ing publication of a negotiated rule in the Federal Register, and giving the negotiators
an opportunity; to review comments submitted by nonparticipants.
83. Paragraph 11 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 11 (1986),
addresses consensus, and contemplates the possibility of less than total agreement on
all issues.
84. Paragraph 11 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 11 (1986),
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Recommendation 82-4 proved basically sound with respect to defin-
ing consensus. As it suggests, agencies and negotiators should take a
flexible view toward defining consensus. Insisting on formal sub-
scription to a "total package" recommendation may make negotiating
success impossible; it may be infeasible for a participant to acknowl-
edge agreement with a compromise.85 Moreover, if the agency partic-
ipates in the negotiations, a total package agreement is not necessary.
Any reasonably sophisticated agency participant will sense, when ne-
gotiations are concluded, what each particular party will tolerate and
what will be so offensive that the party will be moved to litigate. A
sophisticated agency participant will also have a sense of what con-
cessions are linked to gains on other issues. Furthermore, a flexible
attitude toward consensus may permit substantial agreement on a
framework for a rule with certain difficult issues reserved for adver-
sarial comment and decision by the agency. In other words, a consen-
sus can include an agreement to dispute certain issues before the
agency or in the courts. Such an outcome is beneficial because it nar-
rows the issues. The FAA experience is a good example.86
On the other hand, a total package ground rule forces the parties
to make more compromises, instead of leaving tough issues for the
agency to resolve. One possible standard for a consensus rule is to
say that a consensus has been obtained when all participants agree
informally that they will not actively oppose a particular resolution
of issues, though certain of their constituents might register formal
opposition.
The prospects of consensus greatly increase with the employment
of a mediator in rule negotiations. Paragraph five of Recommenda-
tion 85-5 said:
5. The agency should select a person skilled in techniques of dispute resolu-
tion to assist the negotiating group in reaching an agreement. In some cases,
that person may need to have prior knowledge of the subject matter of the
negotiations. The person chosen may be styled "mediator" or "facilitator,"
and may be, but need not be, the same person as the "convenor" identified in
Recommendation 82-4. 8 7
contemplates that negotiators report on less than total agreement, identifying the is-
sues on which they agree and those on which they disagree.
85. Everyone with labor-management negotiation experience is familiar with the
common phenomenon in grievance dispute processing where labor and management
reach de facto agreement on resolution of a grievance but need an arbitrator's decision
to "take them off the hook." In some cases, the disputing parties actually write the
arbitrator's decision.
86. Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1670-71. See also 49 Fed.
Reg. 12,136, 12,137-38 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 121, 135).
87. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 5 (1986). Convenors and mediators play different roles in
The recommendation noted that there may be specific proceedings,
however, where party incentives to reach voluntary agreement are so
strong that a mediator or facilitator is not necessary.
Virtually all of the participants in the four completed rule negotia-
tions agreed that the mediators made essential contributions to the
process. In fact, it is difficult to conceive how any of the four negotia-
tions would have worked at all without the help of the facilitator/
mediators. All three agencies used both convenors and mediators.8 8
In some cases, the convenor became the facilitator or mediator. In
other cases, the facilitator or mediator was a different person from
the convenor. Despite differences in styles, the involvement of the
facilitator/mediators was essential to keep the negotiations moving.8 9
Few participants or observers thought that mediators ought to origi-
nate from any particular source; rather, they emphasized the impor-
tance of mediation experience and competence. Mediation skills
involve more than an ability to work well with people-they involve
an instinctive awareness of group functioning and how to move to-
ward closure.
Recommendation 85-5 reinforces the import of Paragraph ten in
Recommendation 82-4,90 suggesting that mediators should be an inte-
gral part of rule negotiations. There are advantages and disadvan-
tages of outside and inside facilitators. Inside facilitators may be
inhibited in dealing with intra-constituency problems and in inter-
vening with other government agencies, such as OMB. In addition,
private parties may be reluctant to accept the neutrality of a
facilitator from within the agency. On the other hand, the use of an
inside facilitator can be effective in certain cases as the pesticide ne-
gotiations illustrated. 91
Mediation skills are highly personal, and it would be unwise to es-
tablish any exclusive institutional source of rulemaking mediation
services. It may be desirable, however, to organize training and edu-
negotiated rulemaking. Convenors assist agencies in deciding whether a particular
subject is suitable for negotiated rulemaking. They determine who are the affected in-
terests and informally contact those interests to explore the possibility of their partici-
pation in a negotiation. Id. § 305.82-4 4. Mediators, on the other hand, become
involved in the actual negotiation, helping the parties to agree on a procedure and to
narrow their substantive differences. Id. § 305.82-4 10, 305.85-5 5. "Facilitator" is
just another name for a mediator, the use of which may be desirable to reduce anxiety
experienced by those who object to the idea of using a labor-management negotiation
model for administrative rulemaking.
88. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 J 3, 4
(1986), recommend use of convenors in every regulatory negotiation. Paragraph 10
recommends the use of mediators in some cases. Id. § 305.82-4 10.
89. This experience raised questions about the optional character of paragraph 10
of ACUS Recommendation 82-4. Paragraph 5 of ACUS Recommendation 85-5 urges
that mediators be used in virtually all rule negotiations. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 5 (1986).
90. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1986).
91. Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1680-82.
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cational programs and to procure mediation services competitively to
ensure that opportunities for potential neutrals are distributed equi-
tably. If competitive procurement does occur, it is essential to ensure
speed and to have a process for verifying the mediation experience of
the bidders.
Recommendation 85-5 explicitly recognized that federal agencies
such as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or the Com-
munity Relations Service of the Department of Justice may be appro-
priate sources of mediators or facilitators. 92 It suggested that these
agencies should consider making a small number of staff members
with mediation experience available to assist in conducting negoti-
ated rulemaking proceedings.
Some agencies considering negotiated rulemaking have expressed
concern that the process might cost more than notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Recommendation 85-5 encourages agencies to explore
resources available from government agencies, such as mediation
services from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, or the
Community Relations Service within the Justice Department, or ne-
gotiation training available from the Department of Justice.
Paragraph four of Recommendation 85-5 suggested that agencies
consider providing the parties with an opportunity to participate in a
training session in negotiation skills prior to the beginning of the ne-
gotiations.9 3 It is worth noting that training provided in connection
with the EPA negotiations was well received, and parties to the nego-
tiation of Farmworker Protection standards requested similar
training.
C. Intra-Constituency Problems
The simple model of negotiation dynamics assumed monolithic par-
ties.94 In the real world, of course, parties are not monolithic, and in-
tra-constituency disagreements complicate negotiations. Resolving
intra-constituency disagreements depends upon the characteristics of
interest groups. These groups play an essential role in the politics of
a modern state,95 providing economies of scale in the exercise of
92. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 6 (1986).
93. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 ] 4 (1986).
94. See supra Section III, subsection A of this article.
95. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); V.0. KEY, supra note 12, at 7 (poli-
tics is a struggle among groups or interests). See generally J. HURST, supra note 12
(balance of political power generally is determined by the strength and intensity of
feeling of groups perceiving that they have similar interests on a particular subject).
power, and permitting individual concerns about particular issues to
be focused within representative institutions.96
Interest groups perform representation or interest aggregating
functions.97 They operate by intensifying member interest in particu-
lar issues, formulating concrete alternatives, and articulating member
positions.98
The analysis of BATNA-driven participation choices 99 assumed
that parties are monolithic, and that parties affected by regulatory
decision-making behave like rational individuals dealing with a single
estimate of risk. Real parties do not behave this way. Real parties
are represented by individual human beings, but the individuals ex-
press the views of group constituencies which usually have divergent
views. The relations within constituency groups and between constit-
uency groups and individual negotiators complicate the dynamics of
regulatory negotiation.
Experienced mediators know that there are essentially three agree-
ments in any successful two-party negotiation: (1) an agreement be-
tween negotiator A and his constituents; (2) an agreement between
negotiator B and her constituents; and (3) an agreement between
negotiators A and B.100 Agreements (1) and (2) can be called
"intra-constituency agreements." Frequently, the most difficult me-
diation job involves achieving the intra-constituency agreements
rather than achieving the negotiator-negotiator agreement.
The intra-constituency problem is more difficult in regulatory ne-
gotiations than in labor negotiations, because the parties to regulation
negotiation are likely to be ad hoc groups or coalitions without for-
mal processes worked out for internal decision-making. Ordinarily,
in regulatory negotiation, there is no equivalent of the "exclusive
representation" principle from the law of collective bargaining1 '01
available to bind constituents to the position taken by or agreed to by
an industry representative. At any point an individual constituency
may disavow its putative representative in the negotiations, take its
own position on matters under negotiation, present formal positions
to the agency inconsistent with positions taken by its "representa-
tive," or sue to have the negotiated rule set aside by the courts.
96. V.0. KEY, supra note 12, at 203 (referring to the representation function per-
formed by interest groups).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 203-04.
99. See discussion of the BATNA concept, supra, at Section III, subsection A of
this article.
100. Dunlop, supra note 12, at 1433 (referring to the need for three agreements to
conclude a negotiation).
101. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (exclusive
representative); Railway Labor Act § 2, Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1982) (exclusive
representative).
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Extreme positions by trade groups reduce intra-constituency differ-
ences, but necessarily make negotiations more difficult. When repre-
sentatives must make compromises at the bargaining table, the intra-
constituency problem becomes worse.
It is important for someone involved in the negotiation process,
either the representatives themselves, the mediator/convenors, or
the agency personnel, to be skilled at diagnosing intra-constituency
problems and working creatively to facilitate intra-constituency
agreement. Someone familiar with the internal structure and deci-
sion-making processes of institutions, such as labor unions, corpora-
tions, and public interest groups involved in a particular negotiation,
can be indispensable. Even more valuable would be a mediator who
already knows the key decision makers within a particular constitu-
ency, and therefore is trusted by them to some degree. Periodic con-
stituency meetings may be desirable, 102 and full reporting to
constituents as negotiations proceed is essential. Also, selecting nego-
tiators with strong power bases can serve to permit freer exploration
of compromises.
Recommendation 85-5 explicitly recognized the importance of in-
tra-constituency disagreements. It said:
7. The agency, the mediator or facilitator, and, where appropriate, other par-
ticipants in negotiated rulemaking should be prepared to address internal dis-
agreements within a particular constituency. In some cases, it may be helpful
to retain a special mediator or facilitator to assist in mediating issues internal
to a constituency. The agency should consider the potential for internal con-
stituency disagreements in choosing representatives, in planning for successful
negotiations, and in selecting persons as mediators or facilitators. The agency
should also recognize the possibility that a group viewed as a single constitu-
ency at the outset of negotiations may later become so divided as to suggest
modification of the membership of the negotiating group.
10 3
Constituency disagreements threatened both the FAA and OSHA
negotiations. The success of the FAA negotiations resulted in part
from a more timely resolution of such disagreements. Both the Air
Transportation Association (ATA) (representing airlines) and the
American Petroleum Institute (API) (representing petroleum compa-
nies) struggled to forge a consensus that could be communicated by
their negotiation spokespersons. ATA had more success than API.
Notably, the FAA proposed bringing individual company representa-
102. For example, this occurred with the American Petroleum Institute [hereinaf-
ter API] and the Air Transport Association [hereinafter ATA] in the benzene and
flight-and-duty-time negotiations. See Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5,
at 1670.
103. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 7 (1986).
tives into the negotiations. This may have galvanized ATA to ensure
that it remained an effective participant on behalf of the entire
constituency.
Students of negotiation have long recognized that the most difficult
challenge to a negotiated agreement involves, not the process at the
negotiating table, but the process of resolving intra-constituency dis-
agreements away from the table. This recommendation encourages
agencies to anticipate intra-constituency problems. This does not
mean that the agency or the private interests know in advance ex-
actly how to "resolve" such disagreements, only that the convenors
assess the likelihood that such disagreements will occur, given the
adequacy of existing institutional mechanisms for resolving them.
If internal differences are expected to be substantial, and if ex-
isting institutions are not well suited for resolving them, negotiation
should not proceed in the absence of a mediator who has the experi-
ence, skill, and acquaintance with the constituency and its major per-
sonalities. Such a mediator may be able to reduce intra-constituency
differences, thereby validating the authority of the spokesperson for
the affected group. In some cases, a special mediator might be re-
tained to assist the main facilitator/mediator in dealing with an inter-
nal constituency problem.
Intra-constituency problems may be more difficult under certain
types of interest representation arrangements than others. For ex-
ample, trade unions exist for the purpose of aggregating employee in-
terests, and are therefore experienced in resolving differing positions
within the constituency. Similarly, public interest groups have a cer-
tain authority in speaking for their otherwise diffuse constituencies.
Business interests, in contrast, usually have fewer established mecha-
nisms for resolving internal differences. Exceptions might be found
in those industries long subject to economic regulation.
The potential for internal constituency disagreements should also
influence the selection of interest representatives. 0 4 If a trade asso-
ciation is unable to represent its constituents effectively, it may be
desirable to include individual company representatives. It may also
be worthwhile convening groups of major subinterests to provide the
mediator or facilitator with a forum in which to adjust internal con-
stituency disagreements.
Agencies and mediators or facilitators should be wary, however, of
fragmenting representation too much; permitting subinterests to be
represented separately merely moves disagreements among these
subinterests from other resolution forums to the bargaining table
itself.
104. Selection of participants for a rule negotiation is considered in more detail in
Section VI, subsection B supra.
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IV. SELECTION OF SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION
Considering the dynamics of negotiation, not all issues are suitable
for rule negotiation. ACUS Recommendation 82-4 and agency expe-
rience suggest rules of thumb for selecting subjects for negotiation.
Issue maturity and intensity of interest group feeling are impor-
tant. One commentator, who made a study of the decision to land on
the moon, has drawn the following conclusion about issue maturity:
"The objective must have been the subject of sufficient political de-
bate so that the groups interested in it and opposed to it can be iden-
tified, their positions and relative strengths evaluated, and potential
sources of support have time to develop." 105
Issue maturity significantly affects the way different groups feel
about a particular issue and how strongly they prefer variant alterna-
tives. It also ensures that a range of alternatives has been formulated
for consideration.
Recommendation 82-4 suggested that only mature issues be consid-
ered for negotiation.106 The issues must be readily apparent and the
parties must be ready to decide them. If information remains to be
gathered or if the parties are still establishing their positions,107 ne-
gotiation cannot be utilized. Issue maturity is significant when dispu-
tants are individuals; each disputant must have time to think about
his or her position on a new question or proposal. However, it be-
comes far more important when the disputants are groups. Constitu-
ency positions must be determined, and this requires aggregation and
trading off within the group.108 The more complex the issue and the
more novel the possible solution, the longer it will take for constitu-
encies to make this determination.
Interest groups interact with regulatory programs. Indeed, interest
groups arose in part because of increased government regulation. 109
The nature of the interaction is determined by the nature of the reg-
ulatory program because the nature of the regulation influences the
intensity of interest group feeling on regulatory issues.11 0
105. J. LOGSDON, THE DECISION TO Go TO THE MOON: PROJECT APOLLO AND THE
NATIONAL INTEREST 181 (1970).
106. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 47 (1956). This corresponds to
paragraph 4(a) of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 4(a) (1986).
107. Examples of this would be lobbying for public support, media support, etc. R.
DAHL, supra note 106, at 47 & n.259.
108. See LOGSDON, supra note 105, at 81.
109. V.O. KEY, supra note 12, at 201-02.
110. Intensity of feeling is an important variable in the calculus of public opinion.
R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 50. The influence of a particular group or faction is a func-
Professor James Q. Wilson identifies three categories of regulatory
programs according to incidence of costs and benefits likely to influ-
ence the intensity of group feeling."' In the first category, the pro-
grams concentrate their benefits on a small group and distribute
their costs over wide sectors of the population. Economic regulation
of railroads and airlines, milk prices and taxicabs fall into this
category.
Programs in Wilson's second category concentrate on both benefits
and costs. Regulatory programs relating to labor-management rela-
tions fit this category; either labor or management benefits at the ex-
pense of the other.
The third category encompasses the most recent consumer and en-
vironmental protection, health, and safety regulations. Here, benefits
are diffused over large constituencies of the population while costs
are concentrated on relatively narrow sectors. As Wilson points out,
the development of policy is particularly difficult with respect to this
category because the number of transactions subject to the regulation
is likely to be far greater than in the first or second categories.
One can add a fourth category to Wilson's list. This category would
include programs diffusing both costs and benefits such as automo-
bile emissions device inspection programs.
Programs in Wilson's second category are better candidates for ne-
gotiation than programs in the fourth category, because it is easier to
mobilize interest representatives for the bargaining process when the
interest groups are few in number and narrow in scope. Moreover,
programs with narrow impact are less likely to attract governmental
or public interest.112 Between the extremes of the second and fourth
categories, Wilson's first and third categories present intermediate
levels of difficulty in organizing interest representatives for regula-
tory negotiation. The regulatory program must be suitable for nego-
tiation and satisfy the following criteria:
Inevitability of Decision.113 There must be pressure to resolve the
matter.114 Effective negotiation requires compromise and compro-
tion of numerosity and intensity of feeling. Id. at 38. Transaction costs prevent a pleb-
iscite on every public policy alternative, and reduce the desire of interest groups to
have such involvement in the full range of political decisions. Id. at 44. In other
words, the cost-benefit ratio of participation in policy formulation is unfavorable when
a potential participant is indifferent to outcome. Id. at 42-43.
111. See Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357,
366-67 (J. Wilson ed. 1980) (classifications based on group perception of costs and
benefits).
112. See Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Admin-
istrative Regulation, WIS. L. REv. 655, 670 (1985).
113. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 48. This is addressed in paragraph 4(a) of ACUS
Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 4(a) (1986).
114. See Dunlop, supra note 12, at 1436 (deadline serves a vital function in
negotiations).
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mise involves making concessions. Most people are reluctant to
make concessions unless they are coerced to do so by the fear that
the decision will be taken away from the negotiators.11 5
Opportunity for Gain.116 Negotiation must have the potential to
benefit all parties. Negotiated solutions to "zero sum games" are dif-
ficult to achieve.117 Effective mediation helps negotiating parties dis-
cover alternative formulations and to perceive the true value of their
BATNA's.118 The heightened perception of loss in alternative fo-
rums must be great enough to overcome any fear of loss through
negotiation.11 9
Absence of Fundamental Value Conflict.120 The regulation to be
developed must not compromise deeply held beliefs or values since
this would involve costs higher than most parties could tolerate.12 1
This does not mean, however, that negotiation cannot be used to re-
solve minor issues involved in rule controversies in which fundamen-
tal values are at stake, nor does it mean that the implementation of
regulations developed on a fundamental matter cannot be negoti-
ated.122 The fundamental value criterion is frequently misunder-
stood. The presence of substantial costs does not necessarily mean
that fundamental values are involved. Rather, fundamental values
are those which have ideological as opposed to merely economic sig-
nificance, or economic risks of such magnitude that they seriously
threaten a party's very survival.
Permitting Trade-Offs.123 If there is only one issue to resolve or
one position to assume, negotiation is unlikely to result in agreement.
When there are two or more issues to resolve, however, with the at-
tendant possibilities of gain on one issue offsetting loss on another,
115. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 47-48 & n.263.
116. Id. at 48-49. This corresponds to paragraph 4(e) of ACUS Recommendation 82-
4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 4(e) (1986). This criterion is not addressed explicitly in ACUS
Recommendation 82-4.
117. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 48 n.284.
118. See Dunlop, supra note 12, at 1444-46; Perritt, supra note 21, at 1232-35. The
BATNA concept is explained in Section III, subsection A of this article.
119. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 49.
120. Id. at 49-50. This corresponds to paragraph 4(b) of ACUS Recommendation 82-
4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 4(b) (1986).
121. For example, the establishment of a public school curriculum through negotia-
tion would be difficult if the only participants were a fundamentalist Baptist preacher
and an equally committed evolutionist.
122. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 49-50.
123. Id. at 50. This corresponds to paragraph 4(d) of ACUS Recommendation 82-4,
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 4(d) (1986).
negotiation is more likely to be fruitful.124
Research Not Determinative of Outcome.125 The resolution of a
dispute should not depend on research results. The parties may be
unwilling to formulate or compromise positions in the face of scien-
tific uncertainty. Research results might produce a clear victory for
one party.126 Even if a clear win or loss could result from the re-
search findings, the parties might still choose to negotiate parallel or
peripheral issues.127Alternatively, the parties might negotiate issues
to be researched and the way in which the research should be
conducted.
In the four negotiations leading up to Recommendation 85-5, sev-
eral differences surfaced concerning the subject matter of negotia-
tions and the way in which candidates for negotiation were identified.
Only the EPA formally solicited suggestions for candidates for nego-
tiated rulemaking. This survey shifted the burden to major interest
groups to propose subjects which they would be willing to negotiate.
While agency-wide initiative may have produced some benefits in
terms of communicating clear agency support for the concept, it also
may have raised fears among some affected interests that EPA was
overly committed to a particular process, and might force its use
without sufficiently considering its utility in a particular proceeding.
The EPA picked subjects for negotiation which had not already
failed in traditional processes. OSHA and the FAA, on the other
hand, chose subjects that had proved intractable in traditional
rulemaking and judicial review. 128 Other differences between the
history of the benzene rulemaking effort and the history of the
flight-and-duty-time effort, however, made benzene the riskier candi-
date. No one involved in the flight-and-duty-time, NCP, or pesticide
controversies really believed that a rule could be determined by ob-
jective examination of scientific data. Some of the OSHA partici-
pants believed that the matter was simply one of analyzing scientific
data.129 This inhibited the realistic exchange of concessions in the
benzene negotiations because of the underlying perception that the
correct standard could be determined objectively rather than through
bargaining.
124. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 50 n.274.
125. Id. at 50-51. This criterion is not addressed explicitly in ACUS Recommenda-
tion 82-4.
126. See Perritt, supra note 21, at 1253-56 (explaining how similar perceptions of
probable outcomes make negotiated resolution more likely). Uncertainty can improve
the attractiveness of negotiated resolution to risk-averse parties, but similar predic-
tions of outcome are probably more important. Id.
127. R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 51 n.276.
128. Both approaches are consistent with ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.82-4 4 (1986).
129. Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1655-64.
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V. POST RECOMMENDATION 85-5 DEVELOPMENTS
A. MDA
The Department of Labor decided to use negotiated rulemaking to
facilitate setting a standard for 4, 4' - Methylenedianiline (MDA). On
October 22, 1985, the Department published a notice in the Federal
Register 130 chartering a negotiation committee and soliciting requests
for additional participants for the negotiations.
MDA is an adhesive identified by the National Toxicology Program
as an animal carcinogen. Animal studies, epidemiological evidence,
structure-activity relationships, and mutagenicity studies all indicate
that MDA is also a potential human carcinogen. 131 Several thousand
workers risk dermal and respiratory exposure to MDA in the chemi-
cal, rubber, and adhesive industries.
OSHA announced its intention to control workplace exposure to
MDA on September 20, 1983, in an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.132 Moreover, EPA has responsibility for regulating
MDA under the Toxic Substances Control Actl33 (TSCA), but it de-
cided to defer regulatory action to OSHA134 and oblige OSHA to no-
tify EPA by early January, 1986, what regulatory action OSHA
intended to take.13 5
OSHA's personnel and lawyers believed MDA to be a better candi-
date than benzene36 for negotiated rulemaking for the following
reasons:
1. The possibility of EPA regulation creates special incentives for industry
and labor groups to assist OSHA in developing a standard promptly. Labor
has less influence at EPA than at OSHA, and Industry may fear that EPA is
less sympathetic to the economic impact of health and safety standards than
OSHA.
2. The absence of human carcinogenicity studies makes fundamental values
less an issue for MDA than for benzene because there is room for argument
as to the human health effects of MDA.
3. Fewer industries and labor organizations are concerned with MDA than
with benzene.
4. The absence of large-scale health effects, already manifested, removes the
tort liability issue which affected the benzene negotiations. 1 3 7
130. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,789 (1985).
131. Id. at 42,791.
132. 48 Fed. Reg. 42,836 (1983).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1983).
134. Id. § 2608(a).
135. 50 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1985).
136. Benzene was selected by OSHA for negotiated rulemaking, but now OSHA
considers that benzene was, in some respects, unsuitable for negotiation.
137. See Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1651-52.
5. Because there is no existing standard for MDA and consequently no litiga-
tion history, party positions are less concrete and there is less polarization
among parties.
6. The process OSHA intends to use for MDA standard negotiations is ex-
pected to work better than the process used for benzene negotiations.
OSHA modeled its MDA negotiations after the FAA and EPA ne-
gotiations. It chartered an advisory committee as the forum within
which negotiations will occur. OSHA participated actively in the
MDA negotiations, expecting that this participation would increase
the usefulness of the negotiations.138 Because OSHA contemplated
that consensus would be defined more broadly than it was in the ben-
zene negotiations, it expected to gain a sense of the feasibility of dif-
ferent types of standards, rationales for party positions, and
narrowing of issues, even if the negotiators had been unable to agree
on a Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).139 OSHA used a mediator
assigned by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service as a
facilitator.140
The Federal Register notice, following the example of the FAA
and EPA notices, identified thirteen specific issues for the negotia-
tions to address, listed potential participants, and invited comments
on the makeup of the negotiating group. 141 The notice committed
OSHA to use any negotiating consensus as the basis for its Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for MDA142 but declared that OSHA
would terminate the negotiations and proceed on its own if no con-
sensus is reached within six months.143 It is, of course, too early to
evaluate the efficacy of MDA negotiations, because no NPRM had
been published when this article went to press. The fact that OSHA
attempted negotiated rulemaking for another health standard is sig-
nificant because it demonstrates that the benzene effort, though not
successful in producing an agreed-upon standard, was successful as a
pilot effort in exploring a new process.
Negotiations on the MDA standard began in July, 1986 and pro-
ceeded until a consensus was reached in May, 1987.144 The author
138. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,792 (1985) (OSHA representative will be a full and active
participant).
139. Id. at 42,791 (referring to the "rank[ing of] priorities and identif[ication of] ac-
ceptable solutions" as well as agreement on regulatory text and supporting rationale).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 42,792.
142. Id. at 42,790.
143. Id. at 42,792.
144. Id. at 42,787 (establishing the Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee on
4,4'-Methylenedianiline [hereinafter MDA] to "advise the secretary of labor regard-
ing the building of consensus by affected interests on issues associated with a proposed
OSHA standard on MDA"); id. at 42,789-93 (announcing plans for MDA rule negotia-
tion, proposing committee procedures, and identifying 13 issues to be addressed); id. at
48,655 (announcing an extension of time for submitting comments and requests for
membership on negotiation committee); id. at 44,337 (regulatory agenda proposing
schedule for negotiated rulemaking to result in NPRM by March, 1986); 51 Fed. Reg.
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has attended MDA negotiating sessions and has met informally with
most of the participants. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer some ob-
servations about the process by comparing it with the benzene negoti-
ation process.
Active participation by OSHA was helpful. In fact, in the MDA ne-
gotiations, the OSHA participant regularly prepared draft NPRM
language synthesizing OSHA's tentative views and those expressed
by participants in the negotiations. This relieved participants from
having to agree or disagree with language prepared by an opposing
interest. In addition, OSHA prepared post-discussion drafts provid-
ing concrete material for negotiators to consider, reinforcing the view
that OSHA would develop an NPRM on its own if the negotiations
did not produce consensus. On the other hand, the process imposed
significant administrative burdens on the OSHA participant, and
posed an intellectual challenge to adequately capture the views ex-
pressed in the negotiation sessions.
Compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act145 (FACA)
did not appear to present any difficulties. The negotiation sessions
were regularly open to the public and participants have not reported
any particular problems with this format.
All participants were enthusiastic about the process, and reported
that whether or not consensus was achieved, they had achieved a
greater understanding of their opponent's legitimate difficulties. The
6,748-50 (1986) (responding to EPA notice of July 5, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,674 and an-
nouncing consideration of negotiated rulemaking to develop standard); id. at 14,202
(regulatory agenda announcing plans for mediated rulemaking, with NPRM scheduled
for October, 1986, and final action by December, 1987); id. at 24,452 (announcing ap-
pointment of members of negotiating committee and announcing first meeting for July
22-24, 1986; stating that oral presentations by members of the public will be permitted
under control of the Mediator/Chairman; relaxing requirement for verbatim transcript
and providing for detailed minutes instead, and modifying quorum requirements so
that two members representing employers and two representing employees must be
present to conduct business); id. at 27,919 (announcing meetings and topics: August 5,
1986, scope and application, definitions, recordkeeping, emergencies, hygiene facilities
and housekeeping; September 9, 1986, personal protective equipment, exposure moni-
toring, and site visit; October 7, 1986, health effects, risk assessment, medical surveil-
lance, medical appendices, biological monitoring, and removal and rate retention;
November 16, 1986, technological and economic feasibility; December 9, 1986, permissi-
ble exposure limits, including short term exposure limits and action level discussions;
and January 13, 1987, review of committee recommendations for Federal Register pub-
lication); id. at 35,571 (announcing location changes for meetings for October 7, 1986,
November 18, 1986, December 9, 1986, and January 13, 1987); id. at 36,876 (renewing
negotiating committee and changing name to "Mediated Rulemaking Advisory Com-
mittee"); 52 Fed. Reg. 26,776 (1987) (committee's consensus standard).
145. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982).
greatest concern was the procedure that OSHA would use to imple-
ment the consensus recommendation. In addition, concerns persist
as to OMB's willingness to substantially defer to a consensus
recommendation.
B. Additional EPA Rule Negotiations
Since ACUS Recommendation 85-5 was published, the EPA has
continued to use the negotiated rulemaking process. Negotiations
over a farmworker protection standard continued through the Spring
of 1986.146
The committee began by framing the issues that a regulation
should address and the factors that would enter into their resolution.
Its work groups incorporated their first-hand knowledge of farming
operations. EPA consultants wrote a working draft of a potential
regulation that the committee used to focus its discussions. Although
one of the major labor unions involved withdrew its participation, the
remaining interests decided to continue reviewing the draft regula-
tion and to formulate a sound, workable standard. It was clear that
with one of the major interests absent, such discussions would not re-
flect a true consensus rule, so the group was converted into a stan-
dard advisory committee and EPA accepted sole responsibility for the
proposed rule. The truncated group met twice more and reviewed
the evolving draft. EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs built on the
earlier discussions. EPA has not yet published its notice of proposed
rulemaking, but it is expected shortly.
Although the farmworker protection negotiations, like those in
benzene, did not result in consensus, some of the participants, includ-
ing senior agency officials, viewed the negotiations as significantly
productive and expect them to have a major effect in shaping the
proposed standard.147 In addition, the EPA has proposed negotia-
146. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,223 (1985) (announcing establishment of advisory committee to
negotiate farmworker protection standards for agricultural pesticides, and initial meet-
ing on November 4, 1985, to complete outstanding procedural matters, and to deter-
mine how to address substantive issues and begin addressing them); id. at 48,130
(announcing meeting of the farmworker protection standards negotiating committee
for December 6, 1985, to address issues of protective clothing, reentry intervals, notifi-
cation, training, enforcement, greenhouses, nurseries, and medical monitoring); id. at
51,748 (announcing meetings of the farmworker protection standards committee for
January 7, 1986, and February 4, 1986, to continue work on substantive issues identi-
fied in November 21 notice); 51 Fed. Reg. 6,595 (1986) (announcing two-day meeting of
negotiating committee for March 6th and 7th, 1986, to address procedural issues arising
since last meeting and to continue work on substantive issues); id. at 13,091 (announc-
ing two-day meeting of negotiating committee for May 5th and 6th, 1986, to review lat-
est version of draft proposal).
147. Letter from Philip J. Harter to Henry H. Perritt, Jr. (Nov. 3, 1986) (reporting
the breakdown in the farmworker protection negotiations and its subsequent
developments).
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tions to develop rules on air pollutant emissions from wood burning
stoves,148 hazardous waste injection wells, 1 49 and the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act150 (RCRA) permits.'15
C. Federal Trade Commission Negotiation Initiative
On February 12, 1986, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) an-
nounced that it was considering forming an advisory committee to
negotiate a consensus on recommended revisions to the FTC's rules
on informal dispute settlement procedures.152 The informal dispute
settlement procedure rule implemented section 110(a)(1) of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.153 That section provides that written
warranties may require consumers to resort to an informal dispute
settlement procedure before pursuing any judicial remedies available
under the Act. The FTC's rule has been criticized as being both un-
duly burdensome and insufficiently stringent.154 The Commission
believed that negotiation of possible changes was particularly appro-
priate because of the voluntary nature of Rule 703.155 Based on pre-
liminary inquiry by two professional mediators (John A. S.
McGlennon and Gail Bingham) of the Conservation Foundation, the
FTC believed that negotiation could succeed with respect to the
rule.156 The February 12, 1986, notice proposed procedures for nego-
tiation, identified fifteen substantive issues to be addressed in the ne-
gotiation, and listed twenty-six potential parties to be members of a
negotiating committee. 157
On August 20, 1986, the FTC established a "Rule 703 Advisory
Committee" to develop proposed revisions to Rule 703 and an-
148. 51 Fed. Reg. 4,800 (1986) (requesting comments on possible establishment of
advisory committee to negotiate issues leading to an NPRM on New Source Perform-
ance Standards for Residential Wood Combustion under section 111 of the Clean Air
Act).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6987 (1982).
150. Id. at 25,401 (requesting comments on possible establishment of advisory com-
mittee to negotiate issues leading to an NPRM implementing restrictions on injection
of hazardous waste mandated by sections 3004(f) and (g) of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act).
151. Id. at 25,739 (requesting comments on possible advisory committee to negotiate
issues leading to NPRM amending current regulations governing major and minor
modifications to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permits).
152. Id. at 5,205.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (1982).
154. 51 Fed. Reg. 5,206 (1986).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 5,207-08.
nounced that its first meeting would be held on September 23,
1986.158 The Commission received twenty-two comments in response
to its proposal to use negotiated rulemaking in connection with Rule
703 revisions. Only one comment opposed the process, arguing that
consumer groups and consumer protection agencies could not ade-
quately represent consumer interests. 5 9 The FTC responded that a
wide variety of consumer interest representatives would participate
on the committee and therefore consumer views would be adequately
protected. Furthermore, the Commission noted that subsequent pro-
cedural steps, after the Advisory Committee completed its work,
would "provide ample opportunity for individual consumers and
others to comment on any [Committee] consensus. ... 160
The FTC identified three groups whose interests would not be rep-
resented adequately by the parties appearing on the list: organiza-
tions that assist consumers in auto industry dispute resolution
proceedings, state legislatures, and the recreational vehicle indus-
try.161 The FTC added representatives of those three groups to the
Committee and reported that some representatives had agreed to
withdraw to prevent the Committee from becoming too large.162
Representatives who appeared on the original but not the final list
were the Conference of Consumer Organizations, the United States
Office of Consumer Affairs, the Association of Home Appliance Man-
ufacturers, and the Residential Warranty Corporation.163 The rule
negotiation is proceeding with agreement expected in 1987.164
VI. POSITION OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING UNDER APA
A. Introduction
In 1982, ACUS recommended that Congress amend the APA to ex-
plicitly authorize the use of negotiated rulemaking.165 Early com-
mentators on the regulatory negotiation concept thought that it
might be necessary to alter judicial review to accommodate negoti-
ated rulemaking.166 Some discussion of APA problems associated
158. Id. at 29,666.
159. Id. at 29,667.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Compare 51 Fed. Reg. 5,207-08 (1986) with id. at 29,668.
164. As of January 22, 1987, the parties were meeting weekly and anticipated agree-
ment by April or May, 1987. Mr. McGlennon cautioned, however, that the negotiations
had not reached the most difficult issues. Telephone interview by the author's re-
search assistant, Scott Fegley, and McGlennon, mediator (Jan. 22, 1987).
165. See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 2 (1986).
166. See Harter, supra note 29, at 102-03;" Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); Note, Rethinking Regulation: Ne-
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with negotiated rulemaking appears in the literature.167
Since 1982, however, it has become clear that rule negotiations can
be accomplished within the flexible framework provided by section
553 of APA. Through the negotiated rulemaking process, agencies
provide affected parties with an opportunity to influence the sub-
stance of agency rules to a far greater extent than the minimum re-
quirements of section 553 by having notice of an agency-developed
proposal and providing comments. Problems with the delegation of
governmental authority to private parties, ex-parte communication in
violation of the spirit of section 553, and open meeting requirements
under FACA have turned out to be largely illusory.
There are some caveats, however, to these conclusions. If a negoti-
ated rule is to withstand challenge under the standards for judicial
review set forth in section 706 of APA, the agency must act within its
statutory mandate and must provide its own reasoned justification
for the final rule. It would not be sufficient for the agency merely to
adopt the work of the negotiating parties without comment. More-
over, the requirements of FACA continue to trouble participants in
negotiated rulemaking. The FACA has not been a problem because
the Act has been interpreted in a practical way and no affected par-
ties were motivated to challenge the negotiation process.
Analyzing administrative law issues is necessarily academic as no
judicial challenges to negotiated rules have yet materialized. This
lack of judicial challenge is perhaps the strongest endorsement of ne-
gotiation as a process that satisfies the needs of the affected interests.
Consequently, there is no way to gauge the need for legislation deal-
ing with the authority of agencies to implement negotiated rulemak-
ing,168 or the need for changes in the standards of judicial review. 169
It is premature to consider amendments to the APA. The APA it-
self was a product of several decades of experimentation at the
agency level. Further exploration is necessary to determine whether
APA amendments are desirable and if they are, what form they
should take. The risk of prematurely amending the APA is that flex-
gotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1883-90
(1981) [hereinafter Rethinking Regulation].
167. See Wald, Negotiations of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the
Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
168. Paragraph 2 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 2 (1986) rec-
ommends such legislation.
169. Harter recommended such changes. Harter, supra note 29, at 102.
ibility in adapting the negotiation process to the needs of different
regulatory situations may be destroyed.
An example of reduced flexibility is Senate Resolution 451, intro-
duced by Senator Levin.170 The bill contains many desirable provi-
sions, particularly those relating to coverage by the FACA and the
procedure for closing negotiation group meetings. In other respects,
however, it confines the negotiation process too narrowly, especially
with respect to the definition of consensus,171 the selection and role
of mediators,172 and the continued activities of a negotiating group af-
ter it has reached consensus and made a recommendation to an
agency.173
B. Delegation Doctrine
Superficially, negotiated rulemaking seems to pose problems with
the "delegation doctrine." A central precept of democratic political
theory posits that governmental decisions ought to be made only by
politically accountable officials. The delegation doctrine prohibits
such officials from delegating their policy-making authority to per-
sons or institutions that are not politically accountable.
In the early years of administrative law, courts and lawyers were
preoccupied with the delegation doctrine as they sought to rationalize
the exercise of political power by non-elected administrative agency
officials.174 It is now well accepted, however, that the delegation of
quasi-legislative authority to administrative agency officials is permis-
sible if the empowering statute sufficiently circumscribes the exer-
cise of such power so as to permit judicial scrutiny of whether the
agency has exceeded its delegated authority. 175 Implicit in this doc-
trine approving delegation to administrative agencies is the idea that
agency officials are themselves politically accountable to some de-
gree. They are government officers, appointed pursuant to law.176
170. S. Res. 451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 1350-53 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1985).
171. Id. § 4(8), at 1350.
172. Id § 6, at 1351.
173. Section 7(h) of Senate Resolution 451 contemplates termination of a negotiat-
ing group before it has an opportunity to review comments submitted in response to its
recommended rule. Id. § 7(h), at 1352.
174. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-73 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935);
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating statute dele-
gating authority to private industry group); J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 15 n.25 (1927); Stewart, supra
note 17, at 1672-73.
175. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 673-75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
176. Political accountability is obvious, albeit indirect, when the agency officials are
appointed by the President. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976) (invalidating
[Vol. 14: 863, 1987] Administrative ADR
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
When cabinet level officers make decisions, for example, political ac-
countability is assured by the political forces operating on the Presi-
dent in connection with high level appointments, and by the
constitutional requirement of Senate confirmation. Accountability is
less evident when lower level officials make decisions, but it is pre-
sumably ensured to some degree by appointment procedures set forth
in the civil service laws and by various conduct restrictions.
If, however, the agency delegates its authority to a group of private
citizens, this raises further delegation problems. One such problem is
whether the power to delegate is within the agency's mandated au-
thority. Another problem is that the private delegates are even less
accountable politically than the agency officials.1 77
While it is appropriate to think about delegation issues associated
with negotiated rulemaking,178 it is important not to exaggerate the
magnitude of the problem. Negotiated rulemaking does not violate
the delegation doctrine for a number of reasons.
First, under all current conceptions of negotiated rulemaking, in-
cluding ACUS Recommendations 82-4 and 85-5, negotiators play only
an advisory role to the agency; the agency retains the final decision-
making authority.179 Such an advisory role has been approved by the
courts in a variety of circumstances.' 8 0 Delegation is obviously per-
the regulatory scheme depriving the President of power to appoint agency members,
vesting it instead in legislative branch officers).
177. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a statute dele-
gating wage-and-hour standard setting to representatives of coal producers and coal
miners); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1978) (courts
should not defer to opinions of private consultants hired by government as much as to
agency personnel). See generally Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L.
REV. 201 (1937); Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional
Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975).
178. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 29, at 107-09; Rethinking Regulation, supra note
165, at 1880-83.
179. Harter, supra note 29, at 109 (acknowledging the need to grant final approval
power to the agency in a regulatory negotiation scheme); Rethinking Regulation,
supra note 165, at 1882-83 (noting judicial willingness to uphold delegation where the
agency retains final approval power).
In all of the negotiated rulemaking efforts reviewed in this article, agencies unequiv-
ocally reserved final decision-making authority. See 50 Fed. Reg. 29,306 (1985) (involv-
ing FAA); 49 Fed. Reg. 17,576 (1984) (involving EPA nonconformance penalties); id. at
31,145 (involving EPA pesticide exemptions).
180. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-400 (1940) (ap-
proving, against delegation challenge, a statute permitting coal producers to propose
minimum prices and other sales conditions to the public commission that could ap-
prove, disapprove, or modify them); First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697-
700 (3rd Cir. 1979) (approving self-regulation in securities markets), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1074 (1980); Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125,
missible when private parties to an agency proceeding get together
and compromise their differences.181
Second, the nature of negotiated rulemaking, as pursued under the
ACUS recommendations, ensures adequate representation of affected
groups. It provides a standard of political accountability, which is
probably greater than when the agency makes rules unilaterally.
Thus, negotiated rulemaking escapes the problem of unaccountable
decision-making which the delegation doctrine is intended to
avoid.18 2 If the affected parties have been represented fairly in the
negotiation process, political accountability exists, and there is no
need to be wary of delegation because the potential harm has been
avoided ab initio.
The delegation doctrine overlaps other requirements imposed on
agency decision-making by the APA and substantive statutes. 8 3
Most delegation problems are avoided when rules are subject to judi-
cial review under APA standardsl84 If the rule forged from negoti-
ated rulemaking passes judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary and
capricious, within-statutory-authority, and in-accord-with-statutory
procedures standards, it perforce passes the delegation doctrine.
C. Prohibition of Ultra Vires Agency Action
Inherent in the modern delegation doctrine is the idea that agen-
cies must act within the limits of the authority delegated to them.
Consequently, delegated authority must be accompanied by ascertain-
able standards susceptible to judicial review. 8 5 Accordingly, an es-
sential aspect of judicial review of agency decision-making entails
inquiring into whether the agency acted within statutory authority
or, conversely, whether it acted ultra vires.i8 6
The use of any particular procedure to aid agencies in decision-
making cannot expand the authority delegated to an agency by Con-
gress. Therefore, an essential part of judicial review of agency deci-
sions must involve determining whether the decision is consistent
140 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (the private establishment of standards to govern health care was
not an invalid delegation because agency provides hearing on standards). See generally
Rethinking Regulation, supra note 165, at 1882 n.63 (citing other cases approving dele-
gation to private organizations).
181. See Section V of this article supra regarding the cotton dust negotiation.
182. Harter, supra note 29, at 109; Rethinking Regulation, supra note 165, at 1883.
183. These requirements are considered in Section VI, subsection C and G of this
article infra.
184. Stewart, supra note 17, at 1674-76.
185. Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980) (re-
viewing delegation doctrine) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
186. See Section of Administrative Law, American Bar Association, A Restatement
of Scope-of-Review Doctrine, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 235, 246 (1986) [hereinafter ABA
Restatement].
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with the agency's statutory authority.1s 7
D. Conflict Between Goals of Informality and
Judicial Reviewability
Negotiated rulemaking is partly a reaction to the schizophrenic na-
ture of informal rulemaking under APA. The APA requirements are
driven by conflicting goals of informality and judicial reviewability.
As originally conceived, informal rulemaking under the APA was
not adjudicatory in character. Kenneth Culp Davis, one of the deans
of American administrative law, observed that the "rulemaking pro-
cedure described in [section 553 of the APA] is one of the greatest in-
ventions of modern government. It can be, when the agency so
desires, a virtual duplicate of legislative committee procedure
"188
The participation norm, and all of the administrative law doctrines
reviewed here militate against negotiation of a final rule without
some opportunity for public comment. 189 Using negotiations to pre-
pare a proposed rule, and then allowing notice-and-comment
rulemaking (as occurred in all three of the successfully negotiated
rulemaking experiments)1 90 is a sound approach with few apparent
disadvantages. Moreover, such publication and comment mitigates
the effect of nonparticipants' complaints that they were denied a fair
opportunity to influence the content of the rule.19 1
Negotiations can be useful at several stages of rulemaking proceed-
ings.192 For example, negotiating the terms of a final rule can be use-
ful even after publication of proposed rule. Usually, however,
negotiations should be used to help develop a notice of proposed
rulemaking, with negotiations to be resumed after comments on the
notice are received, as contemplated by paragraphs thirteen and four-
teen of Recommendation 82-4. The Harter model and all of the com-
pleted negotiated rulemaking efforts envision negotiations over the
187. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982).
188. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.03, at 142-43 (3d ed. 1972). Davis ad-
mitted, however, that adjudicatory procedure might be "indispensable" when "facts
about parties are in dispute." Id. at 143.
189. Paragraph 13 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82.4 13 (1986)
provides for the publication of a negotiated rule for comment.
190. See Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1671-72, 1679, 1681-82.
191. See id. at 1673-74 (the FAA response to such complaints).
192. This summarizes paragraph 3 of ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.85-5 3 (1986).
content of an NPRM before it is issued. This is actually the best time
for negotiations to occur.
However, negotiations can also begin after an NPRM is pub-
lished.193 In post-NPRM negotiations, the NPRM can sharpen the is-
sues to be dealt with by the negotiators, and can make certain options
more concrete and less theoretical.19 4 When negotiations begin after
a record is developed on an NPRM, through hearings or otherwise,
the agency can sit down with participants to decide what conclusions
should be drawn from this record.195 In other words, the negotiation
would comprise a series of informal meetings with parties to the hy-
brid rulemaking hearings. The relevant statutes do not preclude this
procedure. The FACA open meeting requirements might be handled
under the litigation exception, 196 and representation problems may
have been already resolved in connection with the rulemaking
hearings.197
The federal courts, however, have been concerned with more than
just the participation of affected interests; they have also insisted on
meaningful judicial review of agency decision-making. Increasingly,
courts have required that informal rulemaking be more formal. Hy-
brid rulemaking is prominent among the techniques employed to in-
crease formality.
E. Hybrid Rulemaking
Hybrid rulemaking refers to a set of procedures imposed by Con-
gress or the courts.198 Under hybrid rulemaking, agencies must de-
velop an evidentiary base for rules under procedures less formal than
full trial-type hearings, but more elaborate than section 553 notice-
193. Post-NPRM review of comments occurred at FAA and EPA as a continuation
of pre-NPRM negotiations, but the point made in the text suggested that negotiations
might be commenced after an NPRM is issued, as occurred with the cotton dust
controversy.
194. In some respects, the benzene negotiations benefited from such sharpening be-
cause of the earlier litigation.
195. Post-NPRM negotiations are more vulnerable to APA ex-parte communication
criticisms. See Section VI, subsection F of this article infra, but the agency can miti-
gate these concerns by putting minutes of post-NPRM negotiating sessions in the
rulemaking record.
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (1982), applicable to advisory committees by the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act (hereinafter FACA] section 10 (authorizing the closure
of a meeting concerning the determination of a matter on the record after opportunity
for a hearing).
197. See Consumer's Union of the United States v. Dep't. of Health, Educ. & Wel-
fare, 409 F. Supp. 473 (D.D. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Food Chemical
News, Inc. v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1974).
198. See generally Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE
L.J. 38 (1975); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975).
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and-comment procedures. 199 Examples of statutory requirements for
hybrid rulemaking are found in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,200 and the Magnuson-Moss Act.2 0 1
Originating with United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products
Corp.,202 the idea that informal rulemaking ought to be accomplished
"on the record" gained support. 20 3 In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,204 for
example, the court interpreted a statute requiring that a rule be sup-
ported by substantial evidence to obligate the agency to use certain
elements of adversarial or adjudicative procedures in developing the
rule. Other courts have followed similar reasoning.205
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,206 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that
courts may require more than the minimum procedures imposed by
section 553 of the APA.207 The Vermont Yankee decision has made
courts reluctant to require trial-type procedures in notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking,208 but they continue to require that the "record"
in notice-and-comment rulemaking support the agency's decision. 20 9
199. See generally ACUS Recommendation 76-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-3 (1983) ("Proce-
dures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in Informal
Rulemaking").
200. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1970) (requiring public hearing on written objections to
proposed rules).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982) (requiring opportunity for rebuttal submissions and
cross examination when the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC] determines
that regulations involve disputed issues of material fact).
202. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
203. See Pederson, supra note 198, at 38.
204. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
205. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(requiring cross examination); Appalachian Power Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 495
(4th Cir. 1973) (requiring cross examination); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462
F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring EPA to articulate the basis for a rule in detail).
206. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
207. See Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A
Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee
and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
208. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1169-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (industry failed to show "compelling circumstances" requiring
cross-examination); United Steel Workers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1203 n.6, 1227-28
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying right to cost-benefit analysis and cross-examination), cert. de-
nied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). ACUS Recommendation 76-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-3 (1983) iden-
tifies, for agency consideration, some additions to notice-and-comment procedures that
may be warranted in some rulemaking proceedings. As a general rule, it recommends
that adversarial procedures should not be superimposed on informal rulemaking.
209. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981); Sholly v. NRC, 651 F.2d 792
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb, and Wilkey dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 1016 (1981); PPG Indus. v. Costle, 630
Negotiated rulemaking is a way to develop a rule and marshal facts
supporting the rule without the expense, delay and rigidity associated
with adversarial adjudicatory procedures. After the text of a rule is
negotiated, the agency should publish it as an NPRM and articulate
its own rationale for the rule adopted.21 0 APA review of a negotiated
rule can be protected by negotiating what the parties will put in the
rulemaking record, and what the agency will say in support of the
rule.
In the three cases where negotiators reached full or partial agree-
ment, the agencies published the negotiated rule for comment,2 11
clearly indicating changes from the negotiated text. In addition, both
the FAA and EPA allowed the negotiators to review comments
submitted in response to the Federal Register Notice.212 Participants
were generally satisfied with this approach to agreement
implementation.
F Ex-Parte Communications
Negotiated rulemaking potentially contravenes a policy against ex-
parte communication, derived from the hybrid rulemaking con-
cept.2 1 3 This section explains the ex-parte communication prohibi-
tion and concludes that it need not impede negotiated rulemaking.
Notions of fairness and due process preclude ex-parte communica-
tion between parties and the decision-maker in an adjudicatory pro-
cess. Fundamental concepts of adjudicatory decision-making
contemplate that decisions be based on the formal record, and that
adversaries have the right to know and to counter information in-
cluded in the decision-making record.214 Ex-parte communication
jeopardizes these principles in two respects: first, the opposing parties
do not know the content of the ex-parte conversation so they cannot
respond to it; second, the ex-parte communication usually is not
made a part of the record, and thus should not influence the decision.
The on-the-record requirements resulting from the hybrid rule-
F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980). See generally Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: En-
vironmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979).
210. Such an opportunity for comment is required by the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1982).
211. Paragraph 13 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 13 (1986),
envisions such publication.
212. Paragraph 14 of ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 14 (1986),
recommends such review.
213. See Rethinking Regulation, supra note 165, at 1887-89 (suggesting that the ex-
parte problem could be avoided in negotiated rulemaking by limiting judicial review to
the question of whether the party claiming harm was represented adequately in
negotiations).
214. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing'" 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-94 (1975)
(identifying "right to know opposing evidence," and "right to have the decision based
only on the evidence presented" as basic elements of adjudicatory process).
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making cases naturally raise questions about the appropriateness of
ex-parte communications in informal rulemaking. In Home Box Of-
fice, Inc. v. FCC,215 the court articulated stringent limitations on ex-
parte contact in conjunction with informal rulemaking:
1. Once an NPRM is issued, agency officials or employees likely to be in-
volved in the decision-making process should "refus[e] to discuss matters re-
lating to the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any interested
private party, or an attorney or agent for any such party prior to the
[agency's] decision ....
2. If ex-parte contacts nonetheless occur . ..written documents or sum-
mar[ies] of... oral communications must be placed in the rulemaking file es-
tablished for public review and comment."
2 1 6
The Home Box Office restrictions have been applied reluctantly by
the courts of appeal, 217 and have been criticized by commentators218
and by the ACUS219 as inconsistent with both the realities of agency
decision-making and with the concept of informal rulemaking.
Major questions about the propriety of the Home Box Office limita-
215. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
216. Id. at 57. Another formulation of the concerns raised by ex-parte communica-
tion in notice-and-comment rulemaking was articulated in ACUS Recommendation 77-
3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1983) ((1) decision-makers may be influenced by communications
made privately, thus creating a situation seemingly at odds with the widespread de-
mand for open government; (2) significant information may be unavailable to review-
ing courts; and (3) interested persons may be unable to reply effectively to
information, proposals or arguments presented in an ex-parte communication).
217. Compare Iowa State Commerce Comm'n. v. Office of Fed. Inspector, 730 F.2d
1566, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rate determinations for Alaska pipeline not invalid because
ex-parte contacts occurred) and Katharine Gibbs School v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.
1979) (complaints about contacts between decision-maker and agency staff advocates
should be addressed to Congress) and Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (contacts between decision-maker and agency staff advocates for assistance in re-
viewing record reluctantly approved because of volume of record) and Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting challenge to ex-parte
discussions leading to acceptance of industry self-regulation in lieu of Commission's
regulation of children's programming) with United States Lines v. Fed. Maritime
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (overturning approval of industry agreement be-
cause of reliance on material outside record).
218. See Gellhorn and Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process ": An Inconclusive Dia-
logue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201 (1981); Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex-
Parte Communications in In;formal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 377
(1978); Preston, A Right of Rebuttal in Informal Rulemaking: May Courts Impose Pro-
cedures to Ensure Rebuttal of Ex-Parte Communications and Information Derived
from Agency Files After Vermont Yankee?, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 621 (1980); Robinson,
The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA.
L. REV. 169, 228-30 (1978) (cutting off the flow of informal information would frustrate
effective decision-making); Note, Ex-Parte Communications During Informal
Rulemaking, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 269 (1979); Note, Due Process and Ex-Parte
Contacts in Informal Rulemaking, 89 YALE L.J. 94 (1979).
219. Recommendation 77-3 of the ACUS, 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1983) (general prohibi-
tion on ex-parte contact in informal rulemaking would be unwise).
tions were raised by the District of Columbia Circuit in Sierra Club
v. Costle.220 Sierra Club involved ex-parte contacts between the EPA
and coal industry representatives, members of Congress, and the
White House staff after the end of the comment period on a proposed
limitation on sulfur dioxide emissions. The court declined to invali-
date the rule because of the contacts:
Where agency action resembles judicial action, where it involves formal
rulemaking, adjudication, or quasi-adjudication among "conflicting private
claims to a valuable privilege," the insulation of the decision-maker from ex-
parte contacts is justified by basic notions of due process to the parties in-
volved. But where agency action involves informal rulemaking of a poli-
cymaking sort, the concept of ex-parte contacts is of more questionable utility.
Later decisions of this court ... have declined to apply Home Box Office to
informal rulemaking of the general policy making sort involved here, and
there is no precedent for applying it to the procedures found in the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977.221
Other cases have permitted agency ex-parte contact during the de-
velopment of NPRM's.222 Courts have also permitted agencies to use
outside assistance during the deliberative phases of rulemaking after
the record is closed. In United Steelworkers of America v. Mar-
shall,223 the union challenged OSHA's reliance on outside consultants
analyzing the rulemaking record and helping to prepare the pream-
ble to the final rule. The consultants participated in the rulemaking
proceeding and submitted material for the record. As part of their
deliberative assistance, the consultants prepared additional reports
which were submitted to OSHA but not incorporated into the record.
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the union's argument that
these were impermissible ex-parte communications. 2 2 4
It is reasonably safe to offer the following conclusions about ex-
parte contact in the context of negotiated rulemaking:2 2 5
1. The rule ultimately adopted by the agency must be supported by factual
information contained in the official record. There is no reason that the nego-
tiators cannot discuss and even agree upon factual information to be put in
the record.
2. Persons with an interest in the content of the rule must be afforded an
opportunity to know the factual basis for the rule and to challenge facts sub-
mitted by opponents in an appropriate adversarial context. This may be pro-
220. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
221. Id. at 400, 402.
222. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1978) (implying that ex-parte contact is limited only after NPRM is pub-
lished); Iowa State Commerce Comm'n v. Office of Fed. Inspector, 730 F.2d 1566, 1576
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
223. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
224. Id. at 1220 (quoting Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979))
(finding consultant reports to be within Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information
Act).
225. For a slightly different proposal, see Rethinking Regulation, supra note 165, at
1888-89.
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vided by an opportunity to participate in the negotiations or by an opportunity
to comment as part of the notice-and-comment process.
3. If the negotiation takes place among appropriately balanced interest rep-
resentatives, the opportunity for adversarial exploration of policy and factual
issues is preserved in the negotiation itself.
2 2 6
4. Consultation between the agency and the negotiation participants after
the "record" is closed should be permissible so long as such consultation fo-
cuses on policy, rather than new factual, matters.
5. Placing summaries of discussions in the "record" so that non-parties to the
discussions can know of their substance and have an opportunity to respond,
while not necessary in every case, enhances the likelihood that the ex-parte
contact will be found permissible by a court.
2 2 7
G. Judicial Review Under the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Section 706 of the APA228 provides that a court may overturn an
agency rule if it finds that the agency's action in promulgating the
rule was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." 229 It is common for substantive statutes
authorizing agencies to make rules including similar standards for ju-
dicial review, or incorporating the APA standard by reference.23 0
Moreover, some commentators have suggested that because Congress
cannot delegate authority to act arbitrarily and capriciously, an arbi-
trary and capricious standard of judicial review would be a constitu-
tional minimum.231
The Supreme Court has recently restated what "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" means:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
226. See id. at 1887-89 (suggesting that the ex-parte problem could be avoided in ne-
gotiated rulemaking by judicial review limited to the questions of whether the party
claiming harm was represented adequately in negotiations).
227. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 118 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984)
(no violation of agency rules or general principles of administrative law where ex-
parte contacts are summarized in record of notice and comment rulemaking).
228. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
229. Id. § 706(2)(A). See also ABA Restatement, supra note 186, at 235-37.
230. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(b) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1982) (impliedly
subjecting rules to APA, while imposing additional requirement that agency determi-
nations in rulemaking must be supported by "substantial evidence in the record taken
as a whole").
231. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 359, 375 (1965)
(presence of discretion should not bar court from considering claim of illegal or arbi-
trary use of discretion); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965) (APA section 701(a)(1) excepts lawful exercise of discretion
from judicial review; abuses of discretion may be corrected judicially). Cf. BATOR,
MISHKIN, SHAPIRO & WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 330-75 (3d ed. 1973) (considering constitutionality of statutory preclu-
sion of judicial review).
[1] relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, [2] en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, [3] offered an ex-
planation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or [4] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise.
2 3 2
While agencies have considerable latitude in the exercise of their
discretion, "an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its
discretion in a given manner."233 Agency explanation takes on added
importance because "an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on
the basis articulated by the agency itself."234
Uncertainty about facts may permit agencies to choose a course of
action based on policy judgments, but they must explain their deci-
sions "from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy con-
clusion."235 Agencies cannot merely recite the term "substantial
uncertainty" as a justification for their actions.236
The Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee decision 237 does not dilute
the arbitrary and capricious standard; Vermont Yankee merely re-
quires courts to scrutinize the record support for an agency rule
under the arbitrary and capricious standard instead of imposing par-
ticular procedures. Negotiated rulemaking, as a procedural innova-
tion, is entirely consistent with the spirit of Vermont Yankee, but the
rule resulting from negotiations must nevertheless pass muster
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.
Consequently, a rule promulgated solely because it is agreed upon
in negotiations among affected parties might be vulnerable to attack
as being arbitrary and capricious,238 unless the agency offers its own
rationale and support for the content of the rule.239 Part of this ra-
tionale can be the fact that affected interests reached agreement in
negotiations. Because rationality requires a nexus between the rule
232. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983). The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers case broke new ground applying the arbi-
trary and capricious standard to rescind a rule, but it did nothing new or controversial
with respect to the meaning of the standard itself.
233. Id. at 48.
234. Id. at 50. See also Industrial Union Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
631 n.31 (1980).
235. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 52.
236. Id.
237. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
238. See Stewart, supra note 17, at 1799-1800 (no logical reason exists to preserve
current concepts of judicial review if rulemaking is a political process with adequate
representation of affected interests, but courts are still unlikely to change their ap-
proach); Wald, supra note 167, at 1 (expressing wariness of requiring courts to consider
adequacy of representation and opining that judicial review of negotiated rules will not
change much); Rethinking Regulation, supra note 165, at 1885-87 (suggesting that the
use of negotiation ought to relax judicial review standards).
239. The FAA justification for the negotiated flight-and-duty-time rule and EPA's
justification for the nonconformance penalty [hereinafter NCP] rule are good
examples.
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and its factual support,240 the agency rationale also needs to demon-
strate factual support in a "record" developed in the rulemaking pro-
ceeding. While a detailed record of the negotiations could chill
negotiation, there is no reason why negotiators should not discuss
what should be disclosed in the record to support their consensus
proposal, and what the agency should say in its rationale.
Even if the agency's articulated rationale is flawed,2 41 it is appro-
priate for a reviewing court to consider whether the negotiating pro-
cedure sufficiently guaranteed that the agency considered all the
relevant factors. 242 If the rule reflects a consensus of the affected
parties, this goes a long way toward meeting the goals of Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 243 and ensures that the rule is
neither arbitrary nor capricious.244
If the negotiated rulemaking procedure supports an agency deci-
sion that would otherwise be vulnerable to attack under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, the reviewing court must assure itself that
the negotiation procedure adequately ensured the participation of all
affected interests. Review of the procedure would include the
following:
1. Reviewing the notice of intent to establish a rule negotiation to ensure
that it adequately informed the public what issues would be considered so that
all interests ultimately affected could know that their interests would be in-
volved in the negotiation.2 4 5
2. Reviewing the merits of the consensus developed in the negotiations only
if the challenger can demonstrate that its interests were not adequately repre-
sented in the negotiation and that it made a reasonable effort to participate in
response to the original notice of negotiation.2 4
6
3. Reviewing the rule itself to determine if it is within the agency's author-
ity,2 4 7 and if it reflects all the factors required by statute to be considered.2 4
8
240. Statutory requirements for support in the record for a rule contained in sub-
stantive statutes, reinforce the need to give attention to the record support for a nego-
tiated rule.
241. The agency's contemporaneous rationale must support the rule. See ABA Re-
statement, supra note 186, at 265. The agency's reasoning must also be logical. Id. at
255, 259.
242. Consideration of all relevant factors is one requirement of the arbitrary and
capricious standard. See id, at 250-51.
243. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
244. Harter, supra note 29, at 106-07 (discussing judicial review).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Use of negotiated rulemaking obviously cannot expand an agency's authority
beyond what was delegated to it by the Congress. See ABA Restatement, supra note
186, at 268 (independent judgment by the court would be appropriate to determine
whether agency adhered to limits and conditions of delegation, whereas more lenient
standards of judicial review would be appropriate for other questions).
248. See id. at 250-51. Determining that the agency has complied with congressio-
In this part of the review it is appropriate to permit agency action within a
wide ambit of reasonableness,2 4 9 since an adequate negotiation process en-
sures that the agency has taken a "hard look" at relevant factors and consid-
ered alternatives. 2 50
The same things that negotiators and sponsoring agencies should
do to avoid delegation and ex-parte communication problems will
also reduce the likelihood of a court declaring a negotiated rule to be
arbitrary and capricious.
H. Federal Advisory Committee Act Problems
FACA251 presents a serious threat to the effectiveness' of negoti-
ated rulemaking. A strict interpretation of the Act requires that reg-
ulatory negotiation sessions be open to the public. Such an
interpretation, if applied by agencies or insisted upon by the courts,
could inhibit interested parties from candidly exploring com-
promises.252 Furthermore, requirements for a charter, General Serv-
ices Administration (GSA) approval, advance notice of meetings, or
for minutes slow the negotiation process down.
Open meetings discourage individual participants from making
concessions. If representatives fear constituency reaction to tentative
concessions, they will make concessions grudgingly. Such reluctance
to move from initial postures hampers fruitful negotiations.253
The effect of FACA concerned everyone in the completed negotia-
tions. Compliance with the open meeting requirement, however, cre-
ated few problems in the FAA or EPA negotiations. Agencies,
including OSHA, generally followed the spirit of Paragraph twelve of
ACUS Recommendation 82-4, closing sessions only as necessary to
protect confidential data, or to protect the deliberative process. Some
participants and agency personnel believed the open meetings
permitted challenges to the negotiating process to be deflected more
successfully than if the meetings had been closed. In the benzene ne-
gotiations, efforts to avoid FACA requirements distorted the negotia-
nally mandated criteria is closely related to determining that the agency has not ex-
ceeded its authority. Id. at 251. The congressional mandate is not subject to change by
the particular process used by the agency.
249. See id. at 253-56 (cautioning that judicial review should allow the agency broad
discretion, once the court has determined that there has been compliance with statu-
tory mandate).
250. The "hard look" approach is one application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard, forcing careful agency examination of alternatives and a complete rationale
in support of those alternatives selected. See id. at 259 (characterizing "hard look" line
of cases).
251. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982).
252. The FACA problem is evaluated in considerably more detail in Evaluation of
Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1703-07.
253. These concerns led ACUS to recommend congressional action to relax FACA
requirements for negotiated rulemaking. See paragraph 2, ACUS Recommendation 82-
4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 2 (1986).
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tion process, primarily by foreclosing active agency participation.25 4
There are two reasons for the difference between expectations and
experience. The first reason is that more sensitive exploration of
concessions almost always takes place away from the formal negotiat-
ing table and outside formal meetings of the negotiating group.
Therefore, the potential for harm from public scrutiny was obviated
where the threat was greatest.
The second reason is that no one from the press or the nonpartici-
pant public made much of an issue of caucuses or subgroup meetings
being closed, nor did the negotiations result in much publicity. If reg-
ulatory negotiation becomes more commonplace and is utilized in
highly controversial issues, press or public interest representatives
will probably become more aggressive in reporting on negotiations
and in insisting that FACA be observed rigorously. Such a trend
could result in greater FACA impediments to the negotiations pro-
cess. On the other hand, practical ways of conducting business away
from public meetings will almost certainly continue to be found.
I. C7ass Action Settlement Negotiation
A parallel framework for rulemaking negotiation exists relatively
independently of the APA. When a class action lawsuit against an
administrative agency decision is filed, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure help accomplish the goals of negotiated rulemaking. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage judges to promote nego-
tiation and settlement of disputes. 255 Circuit Judge Patricia M. Wald
noted256 that there is ample authority in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for judges to expand their role in encouraging settlements
in appropriate cases. 257 District judges are more likely than circuit
judges to play this role.258
254. See Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1660, 1664-66.
255. FED. R. CIv. P. 16. Subsection (a) of this rule states:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the par-
ties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or con-
ferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the
action; (2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful pre-
trial activities; (4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough
preparation, and; (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
The advisory committee notes to Federal Rule 16 encourage active judicial pretrial
management. Id.
256. Wald, supra note 167, at 1.
257. Id.
258. Judge Wald states:
There are, however, several reasons why negotiations within the
class action framework are much less satisfactory than negotiated
rulemaking under the ACUS recommendations. The class action ap-
proach, for instance, requires that a lawsuit be filed, and that the
plaintiffs or intervenors in the lawsuit represent a sufficiently broad
range of interests for a negotiated settlement to be fair and success-
ful. Moreover, while recent amendments to Rule sixteen of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure permit federal judges to consider
negotiations within a class action framework, there is no guarantee
that a particular judge would be sympathetic to the process.
For rule negotiation in a class action to be fair, it is necessary that
all interested parties be formal "parties" to the lawsuit.259 In some
instances, such as Costle'260 interested groups who were not initially
party to the action will intervene. 261 In other instances, when the
parties do not intervene, the district court could take an active role in
bringing all interested parties together. To accomplish this, the court
could use Federal Rules nineteen and twenty-three. Federal Rule
nineteen provides that parties who have such an interest in the litiga-
tion must be joined in the action. Specifically, the rule states that a
party shall be joined in the action if relief cannot be granted in his
absence or if he claims an interest in the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair his abil-
ity to protect that interest.26 2 Costle acknowledges that when a set-
[T]he district courts have at their disposal both proven and unexplored tech-
niques for promoting negotiation and settlement. The appellate courts, by
contrast, have far fewer tools. Direct appeals from EPA orders and rules are,
of course, most often brought in the circuit court of appeal, not the district
courts. But very few courts of appeal, including my own, admit to any respon-
sibility for promoting settlement.
Id. at 15.
The pre-argument conference procedure utilized by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals may be an exception. The author of this article has participated in several such
conferences and knows that the encouragement to negotiate a settlement of the appeal
can be impressive.
259. One of the problems in negotiating a rule is the possibility that an interested
party will simply boycott the negotiations and later obtain judicial review of the deci-
sion. Mr. Harter suggests a novel solution to this problem: require a less stringent
standard of review for negotiated rules. Harter, supra note 29, at 102-03.
260. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
261. A party's right to intervene in an action is governed by FED. R. CIv. P. 24.
262. Subsection (a) of Federal Rule 19 provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not de-
prive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to pro-
tect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court
shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses
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tlement involves a rule, those persons who would be affected by this
rule are entitled to a notice-and-comment hearing.263 It follows that
these parties could also be joined in the negotiations through Federal
Rule nineteen by the district court.264
J. Representation Issues
The APA does not address representation problems that may arise
in selecting participants for negotiated rulemaking. Of course, there
are models that could be borrowed from the Labor Management Re-
lations Act,265 the Railway Labor Act,266 or from the class certifica-
tion procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.267
These models suggest the issues which should be addressed when
large numbers of persons or entities are to be represented in negotia-
tions: 1) whether the representative shall be the exclusive represen-
tative of the constituency; 2) if representation is to be exclusive, how
the unit to be represented shall be defined; 3) how frequently the
unit can be redefined and an election held for a new representative;
and 4) what duties the representative has in representing its constitu-
ents fairly.
Despite the intellectual utility of the labor law or class action mod-
els, important differences exist between representation problems in
negotiated rulemaking and in collective bargaining or class action liti-
to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
Id. 19(a).
263. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1255 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
264. In Costle, the court held that the settlement between the EPA and NRDC did
not involve a rule but merely established preliminary investigations as a first step to-
ward determining whether to promulgate a rule. Because this was not a rule, the
court denied the motion to vacate the settlement agreement.
While the companies may not have been entitled to a notice-and-comment hearing
because this was not strict rulemaking, they probably had a sufficient interest in the
negotiations to be properly joined by the district court. Specifically, the court could
have found that their absence would, as a practical matter, impair their ability to pro-
tect their interests since rules may issue from these investigatory procedures which
the EPA and NRDC established. Alternatively, if the proposed modification did relate
to a rule, then the companies' presence in negotiations under the district court's super-
vision would be adequate.
265. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1984) (providing for elections to select exclusive represen-
tation for an appropriate unit of employees).
266. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1984) (providing for elections to select exclusive represen-
tation for employees in a particular class or craft).
267. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
gation. First, interests affected by agency rules often already have
some representation arrangements through trade associations, trade
unions, or public interest groups. These arrangements are deter-
mined by the constitutions or bylaws of the private association, by
powers of attorney given in specific cases, or by tradition. In the ma-
jority of negotiated rulemaking proceedings these arrangements can
be expected to work well, and there is no need to superimpose an-
other process to designate representatives.
Second, many rule negotiations do not envision long-term relations
among the parties like collective bargaining.268 In this respect, the
similarity is greater between negotiated rulemaking and class action
litigation than between negotiated rulemaking and collective
bargaining.
Third, erecting a formal statutory mechanism to select representa-
tives for rule negotiations could cause more harm than good by creat-
ing additional opportunities and incentives to litigate compliance with
the representation procedures.
Recognizing that representation should be addressed in the context
of specific negotiations, ACUS simply recommended that agencies be
mindful of representation issues, and be creative in finding ways to
solve anticipated representation problems. 26 9 Agencies might, of
course, wish to use the labor law or class action procedures as rough
models to define options for approaching negotiated rulemaking rep-
resentation disputes, possibly even holding "elections" through the
notice-and-comment procedure.
The representation issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs
are vertical, involving relations between representative and constitu-
ents. Horizontal relationships, between representative and represen-
tative, should also influence the designation of representatives for
rule negotiation. ACUS Recommendation 305.82-4 identified two
characteristics of the relationship among representatives that would
increase the likelihood of a negotiated agreement: countervailing
power 270 and a limited number of parties.27 1 Negotiation can be ef-
fective only if no one party has sufficient power to overwhelm the
others.272 Increased power on one side does, however, strengthen in-
268. To a certain extent, however, the same interest group representatives deal
with one another repeatedly in rulemaking proceedings before the same agency.
269. See ACUS, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 7 (1986).
270. Id. § 305.25-4 4. This corresponds to paragraph 4(e) of ACUS Recommenda-
tion 82-4, id. § 305.82-4 4(e).
271. Id. § 305.25-4 5. This corresponds to paragraph 4(c) of ACUS Recommenda-
tion 82-4, id. § 305.82-4 4(c).
272. For example, negotiation would not effectively resolve a conflict between a
power company which seeks to build a dam, town residents which support the power
company, and a small group of environmentalists which oppose the dam. The environ-
mentalists would bring little power to the table. If the dispute resolution was carried
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centives for opposing sides to seek a negotiated solution. Each party
must have the power to affect the decisional outcome through either
the capacity to influence the legislature, the ability to run an effec-
tive public relations campaign, substantial litigation resources, or
some other way of obtaining a favorable outcome or inflicting costs
on opponents.
There was little controversy over who should participate in the ne-
gotiations in the completed rule negotiations. In all of the initiatives
except the one involving benzene, the agencies published lists of pro-
posed participants, permitting excluded interests to make a showing
as to why they should be included in the negotiating group.273 Agen-
cies experienced no difficulties with this approach to representation
and inclusion/exclusion issues. One could infer, however, that the
benzene negotiations would have proved less difficult if some nonpar-
ticipating labor unions could have been more involved instead of ob-
jecting to various aspects from the sidelines.274 In other words, the
representation problem in the benzene negotiation was not the exclu-
sion of interests wishing to participate, but rather a more subtle one
of failing to identify and include everyone who had the incentive and
the power to block a negotiated resolution. The process of identify-
ing participants in the FAA negotiation focused on potential intra-
constituency disagreements within the major airline industry associa-
tion, creating an incentive for the association to address such
disagreements.
Some participants in EPA negotiations, particularly environmental
groups, may have found negotiation processes more attractive than
the participants in the OSHA or FAA negotiations because they be-
lieved they wielded relatively little influence over the agency notice-
and-comment or hybrid rulemaking. The negotiation process en-
hanced their perceived influence with the agency. Conversely, organ-
ized labor has long enjoyed substantial informal influence with Labor
Department agencies. Therefore, negotiations threaten to weaken
Labor's relative power advantage. The airlines and pilot organiza-
tions have comparable power to affect FAA policy, but each side per-
ceived its opponent as having substantially equal power.
out in a courtroom or a congressional committee, on the other hand, the environmen-
talists would have the advantage of procedural safeguards. The presence of these safe-
guards would ensure the protection of their interests-provided they have sufficient
funds or political clout and sophistication.
273. This approach is recommended by paragraph 7 of ACUS Recommendation, 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-4 7 (1986).
274. Evaluation of Recommendations, supra note 5, at 1654-64.
The decision to include a particular party is made according to the
same criterion which determines whose consent to the negotiating re-
sult is vital. Thus, if X, by litigating or inducing OMB or the Con-
gress to intervene, is unlikely to be able to affect the result, there is
no need to include X in the negotiations. Nor is it important whether
X, having been included, agrees with the negotiation result. On the
other hand, if X is likely to be able to affect the result significantly,
there are stronger incentives to include X and to ensure that X
agrees with the result of the negotiation.
Representation should be addressed through an initial Federal
Register notice, providing an opportunity for additional parties to re-
quest participation. The approach followed by the FAA and EPA
worked well, and has been adopted in subsequent rule negotia-
tions.275 The agency sponsoring negotiated rulemaking should pub-
lish an initial list of participating interests and representatives,
allowing comment and requests for additional participation.
VII. STATE PROCESS
A. Often Ignored
A final comment is appropriate on the use of negotiated rulemak-
ing at the state level. Most states have far fewer resources for the
administrative process than the federal government. Accordingly,
administrative litigation before state agencies is not as complex as it
is before federal agencies. Indeed, a measure of informal negotiation
between affected interests is a regular feature of the state process.
Additionally, a number of states have adopted procedures to permit
legislative veto or advice on specific rules proposed by agencies. Leg-
islative participation in the rulemaking process facilitates negotiation
among affected interests.
B. Model State APA
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act 2 76 recognizes the
appropriateness of administrative ADR. Its rulemaking provisions
explicitly provide for informal consultation before publication or no-
tice of proposed rulemaking 277 and for appointment of committees to
comment before publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking.278
275. See 50 Fed. Reg. 42,789 (1985) (involving MDA); 51 Fed. Reg. 5,205 (1985) (in-
volving FTC).
276. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Uniform Law Commission-
ers 1981) reprinted in 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 357 (master ed. 1980 & Supp.
1987) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws adopted the first model state administrative procedure act in 1946.
Approximately half the states have adopted parts of the model act. Id. at 359.
277. Id. § 3-101(a).
278. Id. § 3-101(b).
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The Act also allows more flexibility for adjudicatory procedure than
the federal APA's single formal adjudication procedure.2 79 It explic-
itly contemplates four types of adjudicatory proceedings: formal adju-
dicative hearings,280  including a provision for a pre-hearing
conference at which settlement could be discussed,2 8 1 conference ad-
judicative hearings,28 2 emergency adjudicative proceedings,28 3 and
summary adjudicative proceedings. 28 4
A conference adjudicative hearing is applied to cases involving
monetary amounts less than $1,000, prisoner disciplinary proceedings
not involving expulsion or discharge, and license disciplinary actions
not involving revocation.28 5 The procedure eliminates discovery and
only permits the parties to present evidence.28 6
A summary procedure is applicable only when a rule has been
adopted by the agency,28 7 and when the judgments involve only rep-
rimands or monetary amounts less than $100.288 The procedure re-
quires notice to the party of the action contemplated and permits the
party to comment on the proposed action.28 9
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act does not address
arbitration, and state case law raises questions about the consistency
of arbitral resolution of public law disputes with the nondelegation
doctrine.290
C. New Jersey, Tennessee, and Minnesota Experiences
At the American Bar Association annual meeting in New York, in
August, 1986, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the Section on
Administrative Law presented a program on negotiated rulemaking
as an alternative dispute resolution technique. The author was the
279. Compare id. §§ 4-101 to 4-221 with 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1982).
280. MODEL ACT, supra note 276, at §§ 4-201 to 4-221.
281. Id. § 4-204 comment.
282. Id. §§ 4-401 to 4-403.
283. Id. § 4-501.
284. Id. § 4-502.
285. Id. § 4-401(2).
286. Id. § 4-402.
287. In other words, the agency may not use the summary procedure to make pol-
icy. Cf NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (approving
the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter NLRB] making rules in individual
case adjudication).
288. MODEL ACT, supra note 276, at § 4-502(3).
289. Id. § 4-503.
290. Id.
program organizer and moderator. 291 The panel reviewed the federal
agency initiatives with negotiation of rules analyzed in this article,
and considered their use at the state level. Experience with negoti-
ated rulemaking as a separately defined decision-making process has
been limited at the state level. It is common, however, for state agen-
cies to meet informally with affected groups to develop rules. Such
informal interaction occurs more often through bilateral contact be-
tween the agency and a single representative in preparing a proposal
than with all parties simultaneously. Some states, notably New
Jersey, send a pre-proposal notice to affected interests. In Minnesota,
agencies have an incentive to come to agreement on proposed rules
with affected interests to avoid the necessity of a formal hearing
which would be held by the independent office of administrative law
judges. This office charges an hourly fee to the agency for Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) services, and the ALJ has veto power over
the agency's proposed rule.
The participants agreed that the further use of negotiated
rulemaking at the state level depends upon all parties (including the
agency) having a clear incentive to negotiate a consensus rather than
following the usual formal process.292
VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
The search for alternative ADR techniques has not been limited to
techniques for resolving interest disputes. A substantial portion of
administrative agency resources are devoted to adjudicating disputes
in individual cases.
Administrative law has always permitted agencies considerable lat-
itude in the procedures to be used in adjudicatory decision-making, 293
and the universe of alternatives has been enriched by the ADR dia-
logue. In 1986, ACUS adopted Recommendation 86-3,294 recom-
mending that agencies consider greater use of arbitration, fact finding
and mini-trials in lieu of trial-type procedures under the APA.
ACUS also made the following recommendations: voluntary arbitra-
291. Panel members were Philip J. Harter, Chairman of the Dispute Resolution
Committee; Chris Kirtz, Director of Policy for the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency; Duane Harves, Chief Administrative Law Judge of the state of Minne-
sota; Steven LeFelt, Deputy Director of the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law;
William Penny, Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel of the Tennessee De-
partment of Environment; and Warren Kaplan, law student liaison.
292. The panel also discussed the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques in
adjudication (resolution of "contested" cases). Although significant resistance to gov-
ernmental bodies submitting to arbitration continues to be common, the represented
states have been energetic in trying to use settlement conferences and other forms of
informal resolution to a greater extent.
293. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
294. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 (1986) (proposing greater agency use of arbitration,
mediation, fact finding, and mini-trials).
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tion of disputes between private parties and the government; statu-
tory provision for mandatory arbitration of disputes (1) not requiring
development of precedent in connection of major new policies, (2) ap-
plication of an ascertainable norm, or (3) involving disputes between
private parties; agency provision for mediation, by use of a settlement
judge or other neutral agency official to mediate disputes; and agency
use of mini-trials. 295
At least three agencies are actively experimenting with adjudica-
tory ADR. The EPA has distributed "Draft Guidance on the Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in Enforcement
Cases,"296 endorsing the use of ADR in enforcement actions and
soliciting program office reaction to proposed criteria for case selec-
tion and management of arbitration, mediation, mini-trials and fact
finding.297
The Secretary of the Navy has endorsed a test program to evaluate
the use of mini-trials in Navy contract disputes.298
Positive response to Recommendation 86-3 depends on how certain
legal issues are resolved. This section focuses on these legal issues.
A. Precedent
Mr. Harter's Report,299 supporting Recommendation 86-3, reviewed
administrative dispute resolution techniques used by thirty federal
agencies. 300 He also identified five existing arbitration programs,30
and other programs involving agency oversight of private arbitration.
1. FIFRA
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act302(FIFRA)
provides for mandatory arbitration to resolve claims involving the
295. Id.
296. Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement and Compliance Monitoring, to Assistant Administrators, Regional Admin-
istrators, and Enforcement Policy Work Group (Dec. 2, 1986).
297. Id. at 1-2.
298. Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and Gen-
eral Counsel to the Navy (Dec. 23, 1986).
299. P. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the
Administrative Process (June 5, 1986) (report prepared for consideration by the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States) [hereinafter Points on a Continuum].
300. Id. at 118-40.
301. Id. at 141-215.
302. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
use of proprietary data by applicants for pesticide registration.30 3
This procedure was upheld against constitutional attack in Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.3 0 4
2. MEPPA
The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980305
(MEPPA) provides for arbitration to resolve disputes concerning the
liability of an employer who withdraws from a multiemployer pen-
sion plan.3 06
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Reparations
The Futures Trading Act3O7 provides for arbitration to resolve
claims by individuals for damages resulting from violations of the Act
by commodities traders.3 08
4. Superfund
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability ActSO9 authorizes arbitration procedures to resolve disputes
over EPA determinations of claims asserted against the Act's Hazard-
ous Substance Response Trust Fund.31O
5. Merit System
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978311 provides for arbitration to
resolve certain statutory claims under the civil service laws as well as
claims based on collective bargaining agreements. 12 The Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board has also established, by regulation, a volun-
tary arbitration procedure to resolve statutory claims.3 13
6. SEC
Standard arbitration clauses in contracts between investors and
brokerage houses have produced disagreement among the courts of
303. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
304. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
305. 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
306. Id. § 1401.
307. 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (1982).
308. Id. § 18(b). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1 to .408 (1986) (implementing dispute resolu-
tion procedures).
309. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
310. Id. § 9612(b)(3). See 50 Fed. Reg. 51,196 (1985) (EPA regulations implementing
arbitration provisions).
311. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209 (1982).
312. See generally A. Adams & J. Figueroa, Expediting Settlement of Employee
Grievances in the Federal Sector, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985) (evaluation of arbitration to settle federal employee appeals).
313. 48 Fed. Reg. 11,399 (1983).
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appeal on the merits of arbitrating statutory claims.3 14 The prevail-
ing judicial opinion, however, is that Congress has the power to au-
thorize arbitration of statutory claims.3 1i When the courts have
found investors entitled to judicial resolution of securities act or asso-
ciated civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
(RICO)316 claims, they have based this finding on perceptions of con-
gressional intent.317 The Supreme Court has said, in evaluating con-
gressional intent, that courts should not proceed from the proposition
that arbitration is an inherently inferior forum.318
7. NRAB
The Railway Labor Act 319 establishes an arbitration panel to re-
solve employee grievances. In Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad,20 the Supreme Court held that common law claims by
qualified employees for wrongful dismissal were preempted by the
statutory arbitration process.3 21
8. Medicare Claims
Part B of the Medicare Program authorizes a form of arbitration to
resolve disputed benefit claims.322 The statute empowers the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to contract with private
insurers to administer benefits in particular localities.323 The private
carrier makes an initial determination of benefit entitlement 324 and a
314. Compare Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291, 298
(1st Cir. 1986) (permitting arbitration of section 10(b)-5 of the Securities Exchange Act
claims but not of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization [hereinafter
RICO] claims) with Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987)
(both securities act and RICO disputes arbitrable) and Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800
F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986).
315. See Page, 806 F.2d at 295 (citing cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
316. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
317. See Page, 806 F.2d at 298-99 (finding that section 10(b)-5 claims are arbitrable
but that civil RICO claims are not).
318. Id. at 297 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985)).
319. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
320. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
321. But see id. at 330-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (questioning constitutionality of
requiring that common law claims be arbitrated).
322. Part B of Medicare covers "supplementary" medical costs of aged and disabled
persons, such as physicians' services and physical therapy. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j-w (1982).
323. Id. § 1395(a).
324. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.803 to .806 (1986).
"review determination."325 In cases involving more than $100, a sub-
sequent oral evidentiary hearing is conducted before another impar-
tial person appointed by the insurance carrier.326 The resulting
decision is final, with no provision for administrative or judicial re-
view if the amount in controversy is less than $1,000.327
in Schweiker V. McC7ure,328 the Supreme Court considered a due
process challenge to this dispute resolution procedure. The district
court decided the procedure was a violation of due process because
the decision-makers were not sufficiently impartial,329 and that Ma-
thews v. Eldridge330 required a de novo hearing or record conducted
by an administrative law judge of the Social Security Administra-
tion.3 31 The Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence of bias 33 2
and little value in imposing additional procedural requirements. The
Court was motivated in part by the "strong presumption in favor of
the validity of congressional action,"s33 and its holding does not nec-
essarily mean that a decision by a private decision-maker would be
valid absent explicit congressional authorization.
B. Legal Issues
1. Constitutional
ADR techniques such as mediation, or fact finding through mini-
trials raise a few legal issues because they supplement the regular
processes and are effective only to the degree that affected parties
consent and reach negotiated agreement. Arbitration, on the other
hand, though used more widely than most people realize, raises sev-
eral difficult issues relating to judicial review and the delegation of
governmental decision-making to private parties.334
If the nature of the dispute entitles the disputants to an Article III
forum, arbitration is not necessarily more vulnerable than adminis-
trative adjudication under the APA. 335 For the most part, adminis-
325. Id. §§ 405.807 to .812.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.820 to .835 (1986).
327. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405.835 (1986). See McClure v. Harris,
503 F. Supp. 409, 411-12 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (describing decision-making process), rev'd
sub nom., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
328. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
329. Id. at 192.
330. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (articulating a three-factor balancing test for determin-
ing what procedures satisfy procedural due process requirements).
331. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195.
332. Id. at 197.
333. Id. at 200.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 344-53.
335. Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (considering, and largely re-
jecting, the argument that administrative adjudication of a workers' compensation
claim infringed the right to Article III forum) and Atlas Roofing v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (considering and rejecting a
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trative adjudication has been validated by the availability of judicial
review under the APA standards.336 Administrative arbitration
should be subject to the same standards of review.
It is erroneous to assume that the standards for judicial review of
administrative arbitration awards should be the same as those for la-
bor arbitration awards. Statutory arbitration suffers from disadvan-
tages not present with collectively bargained arbitration. Individual
claimants, unlike unions, are largely ignorant as to the qualifications
and biases of potential arbitrators. Arbitrator selection may thus be
more of a problem in administrative arbitration than in labor arbitra-
tion. Of course, institutional litigants are likely to develop knowl-
edge about potential arbitrators commensurate with that acquired by
unions which litigate on behalf of grievants.
Another problem with arbitration is accountability. When agency
officials review initial ALJ decisions subject to judicial review, the
appellate process can correct major deviations from rules of decision
that accurately reflect statutory and agency policies. If arbitrators
are insulated from meaningful substantive review, as in the labor ar-
bitration model, the loss of accountability is potentially greater. This
is not a problem in collective bargaining because union and manage-
ment negotiators can change the basic document that arbitrators are
interpreting or make it more definitive. The statutory wrongful dis-
charge actions of an arbitrator's ability to give his own interpretation
to a statutory term is troublesome. It is difficult to control the arbi-
trator's discretion in specific cases without vitiating the advantage of
arbitration.33 7
The Supreme Court recently addressed some of these issues. In
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 3 38 the Court re-
jected a challenge to. statutory binding arbitration with only limited
judicial review339 under the data-consideration provisions of FIFRA.
The Court worked from the proposition that, "[m]any matters that
claim that the seventh amendment precluded administrative adjudication of an alleged
OSHA violation) with Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972)
(forcing a railroad wrongful dismissal claim into arbitration infringes one's right to Ar-
ticle III forum).
336. See generally section VI of this article, supra.
337. See H. PERRIrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL AND PRACTICE § 3.17, at 146 (2d ed. 1987)
(explaining that courts do not require opinions or reasoning from arbitrators as a pre-
requisite to enforcing their decisions.)
338. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
339. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982) provided that the findings and determination
of the arbitrator shall be final and conclusive, and no officer or court of the United
States shall have the power or jurisdiction to review any such findings and determina-
involve the application of legal standards to facts and affect private
interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no
review by Article III courts."s40 It concluded that shifting the task of
evaluating data from agency personnel to civilian arbitrators does not
diminish the likelihood of impartial decision-making.3 41 The Court
suggested that judicial review of the kind traditionally afforded ad-
ministrative decisions might be available if arbitration awards were
to be the basis for judicial enforcement, 342 and suggested that the
fraud/misconduct/misrepresentation review standard would permit
courts to prevent arbitrators from exceeding their authority.3 43 In
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,344 the Court reaf-
firmed the power of an administrative agency to decide common law
claims.
The following is a reasonable summary of the legal framework in
which the recommendations of 86-3 can be considered. First, Con-
gress has the power to provide for entirely private dispute resolution
procedures resembling arbitration when the quality of the decision-
making process adequately provides for accuracy under the Mathews
v. Eldridge formula. This is the lesson of Schweiker v. McC7ure. In
other words, Congress can specifically authorize agencies to rely on
private arbitration, at least when disputes involve claims to govern-
mental benefits. This can be done even when no form of administra-
tive or judicial review of the arbitration is available.
Greater questions arise when Congress tries to force claims involv-
ing private rights (those existing at common law when the Constitu-
tion was adopted) to arbitral resolution rather than judicial
resolution. The case of Thomas v. Union Carbide, however, suggests
that a minimal kind of judicial review can satisfy separation of pow-
ers and seventh amendment requirements and further suggests that
the private rights category may be fairly small.
Therefore, the difficult question is whether an agency can refer ad-
judicatory disputes to arbitration in the absence of explicit statutory
authorization. Two questions arise with this kind of procedure: does
it comply with the requirements of the APA for adjudication, and do
the principles of Thomas and Schweiker apply in the absence of a
clear congressional policy decision?
tion, except for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by one of the parties to
the arbitration or the arbitrator ....
340. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583.
341. Id. at 590.
342. Id. at 590-92.
343. Id. at 592.
344. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
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2. APA
The Administrative Procedure Act does not explicitly address arbi-
tration as an adjudicatory process nor does it contain provisions for
"informal adjudication." 345 The APA imposes procedural require-
ments for disputes only when some other statute requires determina-
tion "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 346 The
question of whether arbitration comports with APA requirements
can be further defined to the question of whether arbitration com-
ports with the APA requirements of APA sections 554, 556, and 557
when the substantive statute contains the quoted words.
Many of the procedural requirements for formal adjudication can
be met in an arbitral proceeding, such as the requirement that inter-
ested parties have an opportunity to submit facts, arguments, offers
of settlement and proposals of adjustment;347 present oral and docu-
mentary evidence;348 cross-examine witnesses;349 have counsel;350 and
receive evidence. 351
The principal difficulty is the requirement in section 556 that hear-
ings must be presided over by the agency, one or more members of
the body which comprises the agency, or one or more administrative
law judges appointed under title five.35 2 Some flexibility with re-
spect to the hearing officer may be provided. Agencies can provide
for the conduct of "specified classes of proceedings" before "other
employees specially provided for by or designated under statute."353
The question is whether an agency could, consistent with this lan-
guage, designate an arbitrator for certain classes of cases under gen-
eral statutory authority not explicitly mentioning arbitration.
3. Comptroller General Prohibition on Claims Arbitration
Paragraph three of ACUS Recommendation 86-3354 urged Congres-
sional action to "permit executive branch officials to agree to binding
arbitration to resolve controversies." 355 This recommendation was
345. See generally comments to MODEL ACT, supra note 276.
346. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
347. Id. § 554(c)(1).
348. Id. § 556(d).
349. Id.
350. Id. § 555(b).
351. Id. § 554(c)(2).
352. Id. § 556(b).
353. Id.
354. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,643 (1986).
355. Id.
motivated by Comptroller General opinions holding that no executive
branch official may agree to binding arbitration to resolve a claim un-
less specifically authorized to do so by statute.3 56 The report support-
ing the recommendation sharply criticized the opinions as not based
on statutory law, but rather on a negative implication of statutes spe-
cifically authorizing binding arbitration.357
IX. THE FUTURE
A. Activities
The section on Administrative Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion is considering a proposal to endorse ACUS Recommendation
86-3. At the present time, it appears that such an endorsement will
be forthcoming.
B. Need for Institutionalization
A built-in conflict exists in the search for meaningful administra-
tive ADR. On the one hand, meaningful simplification of procedure
is unlikely to extend very far unless it is institutionalized to facilitate
the transfer of information about what works well, and to reduce the
transaction costs of setting up a rule negotiation or an adjudicatory
ADR technique. Such institutionalization is consistent with the
maxim that the government should be "of laws, not of men."
Many of the advantages of ADR, however, depend on the personal
skills of a mediator, the sensitivity of a policy maker to the real
needs of interest groups, and the creativity of an administrative law-
yer in structuring a process that serves the spirit of the APA and the
substantive statute. Too much institutionalization makes it difficult
to bring these inherently personal traits to bear on particular
problems.
356. See 7 Op. Comptroller Gen. 541 (1928); 8 Op. Comptroller Gen. 96 (1928); 19
Op. Comptroller Gen. 700 (1940). But see 22 Op. Comptroller Gen. 140 (1942) (approv-
ing "arbitration" to determine factual questions, so long as arbitrators do not decide
government's liability); 32 Op. Comptroller Gen, 333 (1953).
357. Points on a Continuum, supra note 299, at 37-40.
